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I. INTRODUCTION
During the past five or ten years, an increasing number of admiralty or
maritime cases have been brought in state courts, confronting many judges with a
new body of law and a new set of issues.' The trend appears destined to continue.
There are several likely reasons for the shift of maritime cases from the federal to
the state courts. (In assessing the plausibility of these reasons, bear in mind that the
plaintiff chooses the forum.2 ) First, in state court judgment can be rendered on the
1. Among the useful general treatises on admiralty and maritime law are Grant Gilmore &
Charles Black, The Law of Admiralty (2d ed. 1975), and Frank Maraist, Admiralty in a Nutshell (2d
ed. 1988).
"[T]he terms 'admiralty' and 'maritime law' are virtually synonymous in this country today, though
the first derives from ... the system administered in a single English court, whereas the second
makes a wider and more descriptive reference." Gilmore & Black, supra, at 1 (footnote omitted).
2. As will appear infra notes 86-91 and accompanying text, under the "saving to suitors"
clause of 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1988), the plaintiffs in most maritime disputes have the option of
litigating in federal or state court. When a maritime plaintiff chooses state court, the defendant can
rarely defeat that choice. Cases cannot be removed from state to federal court on the basis of
admiralty jurisdiction, and Jones Act cases are not removable on any basis. Occasionally the
defendant in a maritime case other than a Jones Act case instituted in state court will be able to
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basis of a 9-3 jury verdict,3 whereas federal courts generally require unanimous
verdicts.4 Second, a plaintiff can usually get to trial more quickly in a state court
than in a federal court. Third, many lawyers find state courts considerably more
"user friendly" than federal courts. Fourth, Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
.article 1732(6), effective September 9, 1988, gave state-court maritime plaintiffs
a new right to choose between a bench trial or a jury trial.5 Finally, the narrow
limitations on the Louisiana law of forum non conveniens guarantee the retention
of many transnational cases that the federal courts would quickly dismiss on forum
non conveniens grounds.6
The problems presented by potentially conflicting federal and state law in
maritime cases filed in state courts are extremely varied and often individually
complex.7 This article does not purport to exhaust the subject; but it does try to
provide a broad conceptual background for state courts to intelligently address these
problems, as well as to single out the most important or troublesome spots. The
specific subject matter areas covered were selected on the principal basis of high
visibility in recent litigation.
Three broad themes-each of them stressing state autonomy-unite this
article. First, the procedural issues presented by maritime cases in state court
should be determined according to state law; there is no valid reason for state courts
to look to the practices of the federal courts on any matter properly deemed
procedural. Second, in the realm of substantive law, there is great scope for the
proper application of state law to supplement the federal maritime law-much
greater scope than has been thought to exist. Third, the United States Supreme
Court is the only federal court whose decisions are binding on the state courts. The
decisions of the lower federal courts are properly treated as persuasive sister-
jurisdiction authority rather than as authoritative.
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF JURISDICTION
The story begins with three provisions of the United States Constitution.
Article III, section 2 extends the judicial power of the United States to "all cases of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." Article I, section 8 gives Congress the power
to "make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution
... all ... powers vested by this constitution in the government of the United
States, or in any department or officer thereof." The United States Supreme Court
remove it to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction or on a federal-question basis for
federal jurisdiction independent of admiralty.
3. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1797(B).
4. See Charles A. Wright, Law of Federal Courts 671 (5th ed. 1994).
5. See infra part IV.C.
6. Id.
7. Some sense of the breadth of the field in the world of torts alone can be gleaned from
David W. Robertson, Judge Rubin's Maritime Tort Decisions, 52 La. L. Rev. 1527 (1992).
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has held that those two constitutional provisions empower the federal courts' and
Congress to create and interpret a nationally uniform maritime law.9 The third
relevant constitutional provision, the Supremacy Clause,' ° makes that body of
federal law binding on the states."
The constitutional structure leaves most of the details to the courts and
Congress. Indeed, the inclusion of "cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction"
within the federal judicial power did not do anything to confer such jurisdiction on
particular courts. 2 In 1789, the first Congress took the essential first step by
creating federal district courts and giving them admiralty jurisdiction in the
following provision:
The district courts... shall.. . have exclusive original cognizance of all
civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,. . . saving to suitors,
in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law
is competent to give it. 3
Once that step was taken, the remaining broad jurisdictional matters that had to be
resolved in the case law were (a) establishing criteria for identifying a "civil
cause[ ] of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction"; (b) deciding which aspects of the
federal admiralty jurisdiction are exclusively for the federal courts and which are
susceptible of being shared with the state courts; and (c) setting the limits of state
authority as to those aspects of the admiralty field deemed appropriate for
concurrent state courtjurisdiction. All of these matters have been developed by the
courts within the framework of the statutory grant of admiralty jurisdiction to the
federal district courts, the present version of which is codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1333
and provides in pertinent part:
8. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 96, 101 S. Ct. 1571,
1583 (1981) ("[ln admiralty, . . . the federal judiciary's lawmaking power may well be at its stron-
gest ....").
9. Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 44 S. Ct. 391 (1924).
10. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 provides:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance
thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound
thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.
11. See generally Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 79 S. Ct.
406 (1959); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 74 S. Ct. 202 (1953); Garrett v. Moore-
McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 63 S. Ct. 246 (1942); David W. Robertson, Admiralty and
Federalism: History and Analysis of Problems of Federal-State Relations in the Maritime Law of the
United States (1970).
12. Article III, § I of the Constitution states in pertinent part that the "judicial power of the
United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish." (Emphasis added.) The emphasized language meant
Congress had to decide whether there were to be federal trial courts, and, if so, how much of the
constitutionally authorized "judicial power" was to be vested in such courts.
13. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 9, 1 Stat 73, 76-77 (1789).
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The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts
of the states of... [a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction,
saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise
entitled.
The Supreme Court has indicated that, despite the changes in wording, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1333 has the same meaning as the original 1789 statute. 4
A. The Criteria for Identifying an Admiralty or Maritime Case
There is a large body of controlling federal case law establishing criteria for
identifying a "civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction.' It is traditional to
subdivide the area into the broad categories of tort and contract.
In both the tort and contract fields, many jurisdictional issues are controlled or
affected by whether particular structures and apparatuses merit classification as
vessels. A general definition of "vessel" is set forth in 1 U.S.C. § 3, where a vessel
is defined as including "every description of watercraft or other artificial
contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water."
The definition has served as a benchmark in discussions of the vessel status issue.
However, in the admiralty jurisprudence the specific criteria for vessel status has
varied from context to context and over time. Consequently, this article discusses
the vessel status issue as it arises in particular contexts rather than attempting a
general treatment.
Another general jurisdictional factor is whether particular waters are deemed
"navigable." Here-in contrast with the vessel status question-the case law has
established a general definition that the courts apply with reasonable consistency.
The definition of a navigable waterway for admiralty jurisdiction purposes is fairly
commodious: the test is whether in its present condition the body of water-either
in itself or by its connection with other waters--can be traveled by boat to another
state or the ocean.'5 Wholly landlocked bodies of water within the boundaries of
a single state are not navigable for these purposes.'
6
14. See Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556, 74 S. Ct. 298 (1954); Gilmore & Black,
supra note 1, § 1-13, at 37-40.
15. See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1871):
They constitute navigable waters of the United States ... when they form in their
ordinary condition by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway
over which commerce is or may be carried on with other States or foreign countries in the
customary modes in which such commerce is conducted by water.
See also Sanders v. Placid Oil Co., 861 F.2d 1374, 1377-78 (5th Cir. 1988); McFarland v. Justiss Oil
Co., 526 So. 2d 1206, 1209-11 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988).
16. See, e.g., Three Buoys Houseboat Vacations v. Morts, 921 F.2d 775 (8th Cir. 1990)
(holding that Lake of the Ozarks in Missouri is not admiralty water), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112
S. Ct. 272 (1991); Land & Lake Tours, Inc. v. Lewis, 738 F.2d 961 (8th Cir.) (holding that Lake
Hamilton in Arkansas is not admiralty water), cert. denied sub nom. Land & Lake Tours, Inc. v.
Dole, 469 U.S. 1038, 105 S. Ct. 517 (1984).
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1. Admiralty Tort Jurisdiction
Admiralty jurisdiction in matters of tort is presently delimited by four
modem United States Supreme Court decisions: Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v.
City of Cleveland,7 denying admiralty jurisdiction as to litigation arising from
the crash of a private airplane into Lake Erie; Foremost Insurance Co. v.
Richardson,8 upholding admiralty jurisdiction over a lawsuit resulting from the
collision of a bass boat and a water-ski boat on the Amite River; Sisson v.
Ruby,'9 upholding admiralty jurisdiction over litigation arising from a fire
aboard a pleasure yacht moored at a marina in Lake Michigan; and Jerome B.
Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.,20 upholding admiralty
jurisdiction over litigation arising from extensive flooding occurring when pile-
driving operations in the Chicago River ruptured the roof of a freight tunnel
beneath the river. These cases establish that a tort is maritime-i.e., is within
the admiralty jurisdiction-if and only if it (a) either occurred on navigable
water2' or was "caused by a vessel on navigable water";22 (b) bore a signifi-
cant relationship to traditional maritime activity; and (c) occurred under
circumstances potentially disruptive of maritime commerce.
The first criterion focuses on the locality of the accident and hence provides
a reasonably solid basis for adjudication.2 3  But the second and third crite-
17. 409 U.S. 249, 93 S. Ct. 493 (1972).
18. 457 U.S. 668, 102 S. Ct. 2654 (1982).
19. 497 U.S. 358, 110 S. Ct. 2892 (1990).
20. 115 S. Ct. 1043 (1995).
21. For admiralty jurisdiction purposes, a tort is considered to have occurred where the
defendant's wrongful conduct first came significantly to bear on the victim. For example, suppose
an airline mechanic's negligence on the land causes an airplane engine to fail over the ocean, where
the plane's faltering frightens a passenger into a heart attack. The passenger is then returned to land,
where he dies. The courts would treat this tort as having occurred over the ocean, where the fright
started the ultimately fatal chain of events. See Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 295 U.S. 647,
55 S. Ct. 884 (1935) (holding admiralty law applicable on the view that the tort occurred on the
vessel when a longshoreman working on the vessel deck was struck by a hoist and knocked onto the
pier); T. Smith & Son v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179, 48 S. Ct. 228 (1928) (holding admiralty law
inapplicable on the view that the tort occurred on the pier when a longshoreman working on the pier
was struck by a sling and knocked into the water, where he died). Note that while Minnie and T.
Smith & Son both involved issues of the applicability of state workers' compensation laws rather than
admiralty tort jurisdiction as such, the cases are cited by the Executive Jet Court with apparent
approval as illustrating how the locality criterion for admiralty tort jurisdiction should be applied.
See Executive Jet Aviation, Inc., 409 U.S. at 255, 93 S. Ct. at 498.
22. Until 1948, to be maritime a tort had to occur on navigable water. In that year Congress
enacted the Admiralty Extension Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 740 (1988), which states in pertinent part:
"The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States shall extend to and include all cases
of damage or injury, to person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding
that such damage or injury be done or consummated on land."
23. As indicated, the first criterion-the "locality" criterion-can be satisfied by showing the
tort occurred on navigable water or by showing the injury was caused by a vessel on navigable water.
The jurisprudence is reasonably clear and consistent as to when a tort is deemed to have occurred
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ria-the "significant relationship" and "disruption of commerce" criteria-are
extraordinarily amorphous. As a preliminary matter, it is questionable whether
they should be listed as separate factors; an arguably more logical treatment
would indicate that an incident's disruption (actual or potential) of maritime
commerce is one easy way of satisfying the "traditional relationship" require-
ment. But we need not pause for long over such niceties, because whether they
are deemed one criterion or two, they are too vague and elastic to provide much
resolving or predicting power-in Judge Rubin's words, they are "so imprecise
as to defy description by either a formula or an objective standard."24 In fact,
the courts seem to conclude generally that admiralty tort jurisdiction exists if the
injury either occurred on navigable water or was caused by a vessel on navigable
water. Recent examples of torts found to be maritime by Louisiana courts
include injury by a vessel to leased oyster beds,26 drownings resulting from the
capsizing of an airboat during a recreational frogging expedition,27 a slip-and-
fall on the deck of a vessel caused by an offshore fixed platform's leaky fuel
hose,21 a case of grain asthma contracted by a longshoreman from loading ships
at grain elevators, 29 injury to a worker on an oil drilling rig located on a
pontoon barge in Catahoula Lake,"0 and injuries to duck hunters whose boat
collided with a submerged pipe in Catahoula Lake."
Perhaps the most important body of tort cases falling within the admiralty
jurisdiction are those involving injuries to seamen.32 Typically a seaman's
injury case will easily satisfy the requisites for admiralty jurisdiction under the
criteria stemming from the Executive Jet-Foremost-Sisson-Grubart quartet. In
addition, when a seaman sues his employer for negligence under the Jones
Act, 33 the Act is treated as providing an independent basis for admiralty
on navigable water. There is less consistency and clarity-respecting the limits of the."caused by a
vessel" concept. See infra text accompanying note 50. See also Community Coffee Co. v. Tri-Parish
Constr. & Materials, Inc., 490 So. 2d 1109, 1114-15 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986) (finding admiralty
jurisdiction over incident in which vessel on navigable water snagged overhead electric lines,
disrupting power to and thereby damaging plaintiff's distant coffee roasting machine).
24. Mollett v. Penrod Drilling Co., 826 F.2d 1419, 1426 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom.
Columbus-McKinnon, Inc. v. Gearench, Inc., 493 U.S. 1003, 110 S. Ct. 563 (1989).
25. Cf Justice Thomas' concurring opinion in Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge
& Dock Co., 115 S. Ct. 1043, 1055-59 (1995). For an arguably dissonant view, see Dean v. State,
542 So. 2d 742 (La. App. 4th Cir.) (denying admiralty jurisdiction as to a bridge construction worker
hurt stepping from a wharf onto a barge), writ denied, 544 So. 2d 410 (1989).
26. Fox v. Southern Scrap Export Co., 618 So. 2d 844 (La. 1993).
27. Lantier v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 614 So. 2d 1346 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993).
28. Bias v. Tidewater Marine Serv., Inc., 612 So. 2d 927 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993).
29. Antill v. Public Grain Elevator, 577 So. 2d 1039 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 581 So.
2d 684 (1991).
30. McFarland v. Justiss Oil Co., 526 So. 2d 1206 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988).
31. Sanders v. Placid Oil Co., 861 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 1988).
32. In these cases the key jurisdictional concept is the issue of seaman status, discussed infra
part V.A.
33. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988).
1995]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
jurisdiction.34 Thus, for example, a seaman hurt on land whose injury was not
caused by a vessel on navigable water would have an admiralty action against
his negligent employer despite being unable to satisfy the first of the Executive
Jet-Foremost-Sisson-Grubart criteria.
Recurrent categories of tort cases that generally do not fall within the
admiralty jurisdiction include those involving injuries on fixed offshore platforms
and similar structures 3 -these injuries fall within the admiralty jurisdiction only
when they are caused by a vessel36-- and products liability cases against the
manufacturers of products that cause injury on water but were not specially
designed or marketed for maritime use.37
The admiralty tort jurisdiction area would clearly benefit from a further and
more precise definition. Among the currently undecided questions is which of
the potentially relevant maritime statutes provides an independent basis for
admiralty jurisdiction. 38 As indicated above, it is clear that the Jones Act does.
It also seems clear that Section 905(b) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act (LHWCA) 39-granting to workers covered by that act a
limited form of negligence action against vessels and vessel operators4 -- does
not.41 Nothing else is clear. Without any acknowledgment of the facial conflict
34. See O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36, 63 S. Ct. 488 (1943). See
also infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
35. See Herb's Welding, Inc. v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414, 417 n.2, 105 S. Ct. 1421, 1424 n.2 (1985)
("Offshore oil rigs are of two general sorts: fixed and floating. Floating structures have been treated
as vessels .... [Fixed structures have been treated as land.]"). See also David W. Robertson,
Injuries to Marine Petroleum Workers: A Plea for Radical Simplification, 55 Tex. L. Rev. 973, 982-
92 (1977), which was cited in Herb's Welding, Inc., 470 U.S. at 417 n.2, 105 S. Ct. at 1424 n.2.
36. See, e.g., Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 89 S. Ct. 1835 (1969)
(holding deaths on fixed platforms on the Outer Continental Shelf were not maritime, so that the
controlling law was Louisiana law made surrogate federal law by the provisions of the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(A) (1988), rather than maritime law). Cf.
Bergeron v. Blake Drilling & Workover Co., 599 So. 2d 827 (La. App. 1st Cir.) (concluding that an
explosion on a drilling barge located in a navigable but dead-end canal did not give rise to admiralty
jurisdiction), writs denied, 605 So. 2d 1117, 1119 (1992).
37. See, e.g., Mollett v. Penrod Drilling Co., 826 F.2d 1419 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding a suit
against manufacturer of chain that broke and hurt a ship construction worker did not fall in
admiralty), cert. denied sub nom. Columbus-McKinnon, Inc. v. Gearench, Inc., 493 U.S. 1003, 110
S. Ct. 563 (1989). But see Robert Force, Maritime Products Liability in the United States, 11 The
Maritime Lawyer 1, 48 (1987) (treating the matter as an open question and predicting that admiralty
jurisdiction will be upheld in cases against manufacturers of not-specifically-maritime products).
38. By "providing an independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction" is meant allowing a case
satisfying the statute's terms to be brought as an admiralty action despite the case's failure to satisfy
one or more of the general criteria derived from the Executive Jet-Foremost-Sisson-Grubart quartet.
See also supra note 34 and accompanying text.
39. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1988).
40. See infra part V.C.4.
41. See Richendollar v. Diamond M Drilling Co., 819 F.2d 124 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 944, 108 S. Ct. 331 (1987); May v. Transworld Drilling Co., 786 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir.), cert
denied, 479 U.S. 854, 107 S. Ct. 190 (1986).
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between the two decisions, the Supreme Court in 1972 indicated in the strongest
possible terms that the Death on the High Seas Act42 does furnish an indepen-
dent basis for admiralty jurisdiction in aircraft crash cases,4 3 having held in
1969 that it does not do so in cases of deaths on offshore oil and gas plat-
forms." The Supreme Court has recently said that the Admiralty Extension
Act45 and the Limitation of Liability Act46 may or may not afford independent
bases for admiralty jurisdiction.4" The latter two expressions are much to be
regretted, inasmuch as it would make hardly any sense for either statute to be
construed to furnish an independent basis for jurisdiction; until the Supreme
Court explicitly raised the questions, hardly anyone had thought either statute
did.
Significant further clarification in the tort jurisdiction area is probably not
likely to occur in the immediate future. The Supreme Court has just handed
down its decision in Jerome B. Grubart, Inc., a major case arising from the
flooding of many businesses in downtown Chicago that occurred when the roof
of a freight tunnel beneath the Chicago River sprung a leak. The leak resulted
from pile-driving activities that had been conducted by a vessel on the river six
months earlier. The trial court denied admiralty jurisdiction over the ensuing
litigation against the pile-driving company. The Seventh Circuit reversed and
upheld admiralty jurisdiction.4" The Supreme Court also upheld admiralty
jurisdiction.4 9 The decision does not answer whether the Admiralty Extension
Act or the Limitation of Liability Act furnishes an independent basis for
admiralty jurisdition. However, it does shed some faint light on the meaning of
the "caused by a vessel" component of the Admiralty Extension Act; Justice
Souter's opinion for the five-member majority states that the term "caused"
refers to "what tort law has traditionally called 'proximate causation."' 5 Justice
Thomas' concurring opinion (joined by Justice Scalia) called for a simpler
overall test for tort jurisdiction but did not quarrel with the majority's reading of
the Admiralty Extension Act.5
42. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-768 (1988).
43. See Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 263-64, 272 n.20, 274
n.26, 93 S. Ct. 493, 502, 506 n.20, 507 n.26 (1972).
44. Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 84 S. Ct. 1835 (1969).
45. 46 U.S.C. app. § 740 (1988). See supra note 22.
46. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 183-196 (1988).
47. See Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 115 S. Ct. 1043, 1053 n.5
(1995) (declining to answer whether the Admiralty Extension Act "provides an independent basis of
federal jurisdiction"); Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 359 n.1, 110 S. Ct. 2892, 2894 n.l (1990)
(raising the question as to both statutes); Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 677 n.7,
102 S. Ct. 2654, 2659 n.7 (1982) (raising the question as to the Admiralty Extension Act).
48. Jerome B. Grubart, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 1046-47.
49. Id. at 1055.
50. Id. at 1049.
51. Id. at 1055-59 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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2. Admiralty Jurisdiction in Contract Cases
For most of our history we have worked with a circular definition of a
maritime contract as one that "touch[es] rights and duties appertaining to
commerce and navigation. 52 Professor Maraist has pointed out that there are
a number of other equally "useless definitions., 53 Justice Scalia recently wrote
that the
body of [admiralty contract jurisdiction] law has long been the object
of criticism. The impossibility of drawing a principled line with respect
to what, in addition to the fact that the contract relates to a vessel
(which is by its nature maritime) is needed in order to make the
contract itself "maritime," has brought ridicule upon the enterprise.54
Fortunately, the lack of a meaningful general definition of a maritime contract
does not matter very much in a workaday sense, because the courts have created
what amounts to a laundry list of types of maritime and non-maritime con-
tracts.55
Recurring types of contract actions that are maritime, and hence within the
admiralty jurisdiction, include suits on contracts for the carriage of goods and
passengers by water; for the chartering (leasing) of vessels; for repairs, supplies,
and other essentials furnished to vessels; for services (such as towage and
wharfage) furnished to vessels; suits for recovery of indemnity or premiums on
marine insurance policies; suits on claims for salvage; suits on claims for general
average; petitions for limitation of shipowner's liability; proceedings to foreclose
preferred ship mortgages; and suits to recover ships wrongfully taken or
withheld. The foregoing is not an exhaustive list.
Recurring types of contract actions that have been held not to be maritime
include suits on contracts for the building of ships; suits on contracts for the sale
of ships; suits for services to vessels laid up and out of navigation; and
proceedings to foreclose ship mortgages that do not qualify as "preferred" under
the federal Ship Mortgage Act. 6 Again, this is not an exhaustive list.
The rules excluding contracts for the building of ships and for the sale of
ships from admiralty jurisdiction are anomalous, often criticized, but seemingly
well-settled. A third rather infamous anomaly of contract jurisdiction was
recently cleared up, at least in major part, by the Supreme Court in Exxon Corp.
52. 3 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 528 (1833).
53. Maraist, supra note 1, at 26. See also Charles Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Critique and
Suggestions, 50 Colum. L. Rev. 259, 264 (1950) ("[In the field of maritime contracts the] attempt
to project some 'principle' is best left alone. There is about as much 'principle' as there is in a list
of irregular verbs.").
54. Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 372, 110 S. Ct. 2892, 2900-01 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Justice White joined in Justice Scalia's concurrence.
55. See generally Gilmore & Black, supra note 1, at 22-29; Maraist, supra note 1, at 27-30.
56. See generally 46 U.S.C. §§ 911-984 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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v. Central Gulf Lines, Inc. 7 An 1855 decision, Minturn v. Maynard,8 had
come to stand for a rule excluding from admiralty jurisdiction suits on many
types of "preliminary service" agreements such as an agency contract relating to
the general management and handling of the affairs of a vessel.59  The
continued validity of Minturn arose in the recent Exxon Corp. case in the context
of a contract whereby the plaintiff had agreed to procure fuel (to be supplied by
others) for defendant's vessel in certain ports. The unanimous Exxon Corp.
Court concluded in favor of admiralty jurisdiction over the contract to procure
fuel and overruled Minturn, stating:
We conclude that Minturn is incompatible with current principles of
admiralty jurisdiction over contracts and therefore should be overruled.
We emphasize that our ruling is a narrow one. We remove only the
precedent of Minturn from the body of rules that have developed over
what types of contracts are maritime. Rather than apply a rule
excluding all or certain agency contracts from the realm of admiralty,
lower courts should look to the subject matter of the agency contract
and determine whether the services performed under the contract are
maritime in nature.60
Exxon Corp. establishes that agency contracts can be maritime, and it provides
a potential basis for similar treatment of other types of "preliminary services"
contracts such as agreements to procure a vessel charter or a policy of marine
insurance.
Perhaps the most troublesome area in the general field of contract
jurisdiction involves the "mixed contract," that is a contract in which some of the
features are maritime in nature. In this area the federal courts have shown great
inconsistency. On the one hand, it is said that "[clourts have long recognized
that in breach of contract cases, admiralty jurisdiction arises only when the
subject matter of the contract is 'purely' or 'wholly' maritime in nature."6 On
the other hand:
Despite the veneration accorded the statement that a contract must be
"wholly" maritime for a court to assert admiralty jurisdiction over it,
courts have repeatedly qualified that rule in two ways. First, if a
contract is partially maritime and partially non-maritime, the court will
entertain admiralty jurisdiction if the maritime and non-maritime
57. 500 U.S. 603, 111 S. Ct. 2071 (1991).
58. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 477 (1855).
59. Roughly speaking, a preliminary service agreement is any contract whereby someone
promises a vessel operator to arrange for someone else to furnish necessary services or supplies to
the vessel.
60. Exxon Corp., 500 U.S. at 612, 111 S. Ct. at 2076-77.




portions of the contract can be severed without prejudice to either party.
Second, a federal court may exercise maritime jurisdiction over the
entire contract if the non-maritime aspects of the [transaction] are
"merely incidental." '62
One recurrent type of mixed contract is a lease-purchase agreement on a
vessel. The lease (charter) features of such a contract are maritime, whereas the
sale features are not. Courts have often severed the maritime and non-maritime
aspects of such agreements so as to permit admiralty litigation on the maritime
portion."
Another recurrent type of mixed contract case involves damage or loss of
cargo that has been transported partially by sea and partially by land. Here, the
severance technique is ordinarily not useful.' . Courts have occasionally found
that the land transport features are "incidental" to the main maritime contract for
sea carriage, but more often they have been forced to conclude that the
provisions for land transportation make the contract as a whole non-maritime. 65
Recent Louisiana decisions presenting contract jurisdiction issues have
tracked the federal jurisprudence on such settled matters as the maritime nature
of vessel charter contracts" and the non-maritime nature of contracts for the
sale of vessels 67 (and of vessel engines68). A number of the troublesome
Louisiana cases have involved indemnity agreements in contracts relating to
offshore oil and gas activities.69 Here the admiralty jurisdiction issue is crucial,
62. Id. (citations omitted). The court actually wrote "if the non-maritime aspects of the
transportation are 'merely incidental,"' but must have meant "transaction." (Emphasis added.)
63. See, e.g., Jack Neilson, Inc. v. Tug Peggy, 428 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 973 (1971).
64. See Berkshire Fashions, Inc., 954 F.2d at 881:
In cases in which there is one bill of lading and one total charge for all of the services
performed in accord with that bill, courts have generally found the contract non-severable.
This is so because the consolidation of a number of transport services under one contract
at one flat price renders the disentanglement of the various services difficult.
(Citations omitted.)
65. See generally Berkshire Fashions, Inc. v. M.V. Hakusan II, 954 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1992).
The Maritime Law Association of the United States is currently working on proposed amendments
to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1300-1315 (1988), one of which would make
the statute an independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction in these mixed transport cases.
66. See Authement v. Conoco, Inc., 566 So. 2d 640, 644 (La. App. 5th Cir.) ("A ship charter
is unquestionably a maritime contract ... and thus ... an indemnity clause in that [contract is
governed by maritime law.]"), writ denied, 569 So. 2d 960 (1990).
67. See Poche v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 632 So. 2d 1170 (La. App. 5th Cit. 1994) (resolving
a redhibition suit against the seller of a vessel without mentioning admiralty jurisdiction or maritime
law).
68. See MTU of N. Am. v. Raven Marine, 603 So. 2d 803, 807 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1992)
(holding a redhibition suit against a manufacturer of ships' engines is not within the admiralty
jurisdiction and therefore must be governed by state law), writ denied, 612 So. 2d 55 (1993).
69. Broadly speaking, these are contracts whereby a contractor doing work for an oil company
promises to indemnify the oil company against any claims arising from injuries to person or property
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because the Louisiana Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act7° would nullify most such
agreements,7' whereas they are valid under maritime law. The leading case
setting forth the criteria for determining the maritime nature of particular
indemnity agreements of this type is Judge Rubin's decision for the federal Fifth
Circuit in Davis & Sons, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp.,72 which lays down no clear rule
but is generally regarded as having brought some reason to the process of
characterizing these highly prevalent contracts.
In Davis & Sons, Inc., the court sustained admiralty jurisdiction over a
contract for maintenance work conducted from spud barges in a fixed-platform
oil field located in open water. Judge Rubin explained that most of the contracts
giving rise to the recurrent jurisdictional issue consist of a blanket agreement
between an oil company and a contractor, which is then fleshed out by specific
work orders. The principal focus of inquiry should be the work order under
which the injury giving rise to the indemnity claim was sustained. Looking at
"the blanket contract as modified by the later work order,"73 Judge Rubin's
approach was as follows:
We consider six factors in characterizing the contract: (1) what does
the specific work order in effect at the time of injury provide? (2) what
work did the crew assigned under the work order actually do? (3) was
the crew assigned to work aboard a vessel in navigable waters? (4) to
what extent did the work being done relate to the mission of that
vessel? (5) what was the principal work of the injured worker? and (6)
what work was the injured worker actually doing at the time of
injury?74
Obviously, the six Davis & Sons, Inc. factors in combination constitute a
very elastic test, and the decisions using the Davis & Sons, Inc. approach are
difficult to harmonize.75 The Louisiana Supreme Court has denied writs in
incurred in the course of the work.
70. La. R.S. 9:2780 (1991).
71. See generally Daigle v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Co., 610 So. 2d 883 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1992).
72. 919 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1990).
73. Id. at 315.
74. Id. at 316.
75. In Domingue v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 923 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied sub nom. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co. v. Dimensional Oilfield Servs., Inc., 502 U.S.
1033, 112 S. Ct. 874 (1992), the court used the Davis & Sons, Inc. approach to label as non-maritime
a contract remarkably similar to the one declared maritime in Davis & Sons, Inc. Davis & Sons, Inc.
was distinguished on the principal basis that the injured worker in Davis & Sons, Inc. was involved
with self-propelled work barges that moved frequently whereas the Domingue worker's duties were
on a jack-up barge involved in no movement at the time of the particular work. For state court cases
using the Davis & Sons, Inc. factors that reach seemingly irreconcilable outcomes, see Brennan v.
Shell Oil Co., 612 So. 2d 929 (La. App. 4th Cir.) (holding a contract calling for indemnity against
a claim by an injured welder on jack-up barge to be non-maritime), writ denied, 614 So. 2d 1268
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cases that apply Davis & Sons, Inc. to reach seemingly inconsistent results. 76
In Rodrigue v. Legros," the supreme court's only modem decision addressing
the general subject of offshore oil field indemnity contracts, the parties conceded
that the contract was maritime78 and thus the court had no occasion to address
the Davis & Sons, Inc. factors or to consider formulating an alternative approach
to making the jurisdictional determination."
The issue whether particular indemnity agreements will be construed as
maritime (and therefore valid) or as non-maritime (and therefore probably
invalid) is likely to continue to be heavily litigated. When someone of Judge
Rubin's expertise and analytical power attempts to reduce an area to a clear
principle and comes up with a flexible six-factor approach, we can be assured
that the area is genuinely complex and that greater simplification may be
impossible. Still, after looking at the pattern of results in a large number of
these cases, the temptation is to suggest that the single most important factor to
consider may be the extent to which the worker whose injury gave rise to the
indemnity claim was engaged in work involving the movement of a vessel.
B. When is Federal Court Admiralty Jurisdiction Exclusive?
As indicated above, the controlling statute (28 U.S.C. § 1333) states that the
federal courts have exclusive original jurisdiction in admiralty cases, "saving to
suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled."'8
The statute has been interpreted as making federal court admiralty jurisdiction
exclusive as to actions in rem against vessels or against other maritime
property.8 Federal court admiralty jurisdiction is also exclusive in "certain
(1993); Sampsell v. B&I Welding Servs., 618 So. 2d 1137 (La. App. 4th Cir.) (holding a contract
calling for indemnity against a claim by an injured pipe-lay barge welder to be maritime), writ
denied, 629 So. 2d 346 (1993).
76. See Brennan v. Shell Oil Co., 612 So. 2d 929 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 614 So. 2d
1268 (1993); Sampsell v. B&I Welding Servs., 618 So. 2d 1137 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 629
So. 2d 346 (1993).
77. 563 So. 2d'248 (La. 1990).
78. Id. at 257 (refusing to let the defendant raise the jurisdiction point for the first time on
rehearing).
79. The issue in Rodrigue was whether maritime or state law should govern the validity of the
indemnity provisions of a contract concededly maritime. The court applied maritime law and
articulated reasons that, on their face, could also be used to support a presumption in favor of treating
debatably maritime indemnity agreements as maritime for jurisdictional purposes. But the court did
not indicate any such presumption was intended to be created; ultimately the opinion stressed the
defendant's concession that the contract in suit was maritime in nature.
80. Remember the Supreme Court has concluded the rather dramatic 1948 change in the
wording of the saving clause-from "saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law
remedy where the common law is competent to give it" to the present wording "saving to suitors in
all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled"-effected no change in the clause's
meaning. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry & Mach. Co., 237 U.S. 303, 35 S. Ct. 596 (1915).
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statutory actions, '82 including petitions for limitation of liability83 and suits
against the United States under the Suits in Admiralty Act" and the Public
Vessels Act.8
Most admiralty cases, however, are cases of concurrent jurisdiction rather
than exclusive jurisdiction. The plaintiff may bring the case in federal court on
the basis of admiralty jurisdiction, or the plaintiff may take advantage of the
"6saving to suitors" clause, which has been interpreted as giving the plaintiff in
most types of admiralty or maritime cases the option of bringing the suit in state
court or, if the requisites of federal court jurisdiction on some other basis than
admiralty can be made out, on the "law side" of federal court.86
C. What Are the General Limits of State Authority in Concurrent Jurisdiction
Cases?
When a maritime plaintiff takes advantage of the saving clause option to
bring her case in state court, as a matter of general principle the state court is
obligated by the Constitution's Supremacy Clause to follow the applicable
substantive federal maritime law.8 7 On matters of procedure, the state court is
generally free to follow the state's own rules.88 The Supremacy Clause restraint
on the state courts is often called "the reverse-Erie doctrine." 89 The label is
intended to signal that the situation of a state court in a saving clause case is
very closely analogous to that of a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction
under the constraints of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.' In the words of the
United States Supreme Court:
State courts occasionally say that they "have in rem jurisdiction" pursuant to seizures of vessels.
Barcelona v. Sea Victory Maritime, Inc., 619 So. 2d 741, 743 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 626
So. 2d 1179 (1993). It is important to note such statements refer to in rem jurisdiction in "the broad
sense' as oppose to the "strict" sense applicable to the maritime action in rem. See Maraist, supra
note 1, at 334. The central characteristic of the maritime action in rem-in rem in the strict sense-is
that "a judicial sale in the proceeding conveys title good against the world." Id. at 335. State courts
cannot do that.
82. Linton v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 964 F.2d 1480, 1488 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 467 (1992).
83. See 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 181-196 (1988); Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. Rule F.
84. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 741-752 (1988).
85. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 781-790 (1988).
86. See generally Linton v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 964 F.2d 1480 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 467 (1992); Lavergne v. Western Co. of N. Am,, 371 So. 2d 807 (La. 1979).
87. See Robertson, supra note 11, chs. 10 and 11, at 185-201.
88. See Cason v. Diamond M Drilling Co., 436 So. 2d 1245, 1248 (La. App. 1st Cir.) ("In an
action brought in state court under the 'saving to suitors' clause, federal substantive law applies, but
where the result is not substantially affected, the procedural law of the forum applies."), writ denied,
441 So. 2d 1221 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 938, 104 S. Ct. 1911 (1984). See also Perry v. Allied
Offshore Marine Corp., 618 So. 2d 1033, 1036 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993) (same).
89. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 11, at 201.
90. 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938).
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[T]he "saving to suitors" clause allows state courts to entertain in
personam maritime causes of action, but in such cases the extent to
which state law may be used to remedy maritime injuries is constrained
by a so-called "reverse-Erie" doctrine which requires that the substan-
tive remedies afforded by the states conform to governing federal
maritime standards. 91
The operation of the reverse-Erie doctrine is explored in detail in the next part.
II. WHEN ARE STATE COURTS BOUND TO FOLLOW THE FEDERAL COURTS:
CURRENT GENERAL VIEWS OF REVERSE-ERIE PREEMPTION
Almost a quarter-century ago this author published a book attempting to
make sense of the United States Supreme Court's pronouncements on the proper
interaction of federal and state law in maritime cases.92 It has since become
clear that those pronouncements taken in the aggregate simply do not make
complete sense. The Louisiana Supreme Court has taken note of the difficulty:
Despite [the] multitude of cases involving the applicability of state law
in maritime situations, the [United States Supreme] Court has developed
no clear test for determining when such application is appropriate and
when it violates the constitution. Instead, the Court has generally stated
only its conclusion as to whether the application of state law was
permissible, and these conclusions have not always been theoretically
consistent.
93
And Justice Scalia has recently written:
It would be idle to pretend that the line separating permissible from
impermissible state regulation is readily discernible in our admiralty
jurisprudence, or indeed is even entirely consistent within our admiralty
jurisprudence."
Justice Scalia's candor is welcome, albeit perhaps understated. The United
States Supreme Court's maritime preemption decisions fall into no clear pattern.
Part of the difficulty is that the Court is still paying lip service to its 1917
decision in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen.95 The narrow holding of Jensen
was that a state workers' compensation statute could not constitutionally be
91. Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 222-23, 106 S. Ct. 2485, 2494 (1986).
92. See Robertson, supra note 11.
93. Rodrigue v. Legros, 563 So. 2d 248, 253 (La. 1990) (citation omitted).
94. American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 114 S. Ct. 981, 987 (1994).
95. 244 U.S. 205, 37 S. Ct. 524 (1917). In the recent American Dredging Co. case, Justice
Stevens urged that Jensen be overruled, but Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, refused to do so
"without argument or even invitation" by the parties. American Dredging Co., 114 S. Ct. at 985 n.I.
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applied to redress an injury to a longshoreman injured on navigable water. The
broad thrust of Jensen was the permissible scope of state law in maritime cases
is narrowly limited: the Jensen Court stated no state law can apply that "works
material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law or
interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international
and interstate relations." 9 The quoted language has served as a framework for
discussion in the reverse-Erie preemption cases. It is too elastic to answer any
questions, yet its tone and tenor are misleading. The current United States
Supreme Court's views of reverse-Erie preemption are a great deal more
permissive than the Jensen holding and language would suggest.
97
Clearly there are many settled areas in which federal maritime law preempts
state law in cases falling within the admiralty jurisdiction. Familiar examples
include Jones Act98 and unseaworthiness litigation, most features of which are
fully governed by federal law; 99 actions for loss of consortium, society, and
companionship brought by the family members of fatally injured maritime
workers, in which state wrongful death law, may be completely inapplicable;"°
and the applicability of the federal law of limitations (liberative prescription) to
all maritime tort suits.1m
The foregoing and other areas of clear federal law preemption subsist against
a general background of applicable state law. An obvious practical truth about
saving clause cases-one so obvious that it is rarely explicitly discussed-is that
state judges, who operate on a daily basis on the assumption that the case at
hand is governed procedurally and substantively by state law, do not abandon
that assumption when they turn their attention to maritime cases. Unless a
litigant brings forth a specific federal doctrine that is putatively preemptive, state
96. Jensen, 244 U.S. at 216, 37 S. Ct. at 529.
97. See the discussion of American Dredging Co. v. Miller, infra notes 130-144 and
accompanying text. Cf. O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 114 S. Ct. 2048 (1994) (stressing the limits
of federal authority in the course of holding that state law-not federal common law-governs
whether the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, receiver for a failed S&L, is estopped by virtue
of the S&L's fraudulent practices from pursuing tort claims on the S&L's behalf).
98. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988).
99. For example, the burden of proof allocation in Jones Act cases is a matter of binding
federal law. See Butler v. Zapata Haynie Corp., 633 So. 2d 1274, 1282 (La. App. 3d Cir.) (following
federal law on Jones Act burden), amended on other grounds, 639 So. 2d 1186 (La.), cert. denied
sub nom. Zapata Protein (USA), Inc. v. Butler, 115 S. Ct. 579 (1994). See also Gray v. Texaco, Inc.,
610 So. 2d 1090, 1093-94 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992), writs denied, 616 So. 2d 686, 687 (1993). Cf.
American Dredging Co., 114 S. Ct. at 988 (noting the burden of proof is now "viewed as a matter
of substance").
100. See infra part V.E.
101. See McCraine v. Hondo Boats, Inc., 399 So. 2d 163 (La. 1981) (holding the maritime
doctrine of laches rather than state one-year prescription rule governed a suit for boating injuries),
cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1105, 102 S. Ct. 3483 (1982). 46 U.S.C. app. § 763a (1988), enacted in 1980,
now provides a three-year statute of limitations for all maritime personal injury and wrongful death
suits. Other maritime actions continue to be governed by the doctrine of laches.
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law will probably govern fully.'0 2 In this sense, a specific federal maritime
doctrine can be seen as a slightly odd fish that may be allowed to swim in the
circumambient state-law waters, provided that a litigant has produced the fish's
reverse-Erie pedigree. The Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal's recent
decision in Lantier v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.'°3 is a good illustration of
the phenomenon under discussion. This was a suit against an airboat operator
and his liability insurer based upon the drowning of two of the operator's
companions during a recreational frogging expedition on navigable waters. The
plaintiffs correctly labeled it a saving clause case.'04 (The case could clearly
have been maintained as an admiralty case in federal court; °5 this fact alone
makes it a saving clause case by definition.) Yet the only feature of maritime
law discussed in the decision was appellants' unsuccessful argument that a jury
trial had been improper.' 6 As to the following matters, the third circuit used
state law without any reverse-Erie alteration or comment: the standard of
appellate review; the propriety of a direct action against the insurer; the rules for
interpreting an insurance contract; comparative fault; res ipsa loquitur; the seat-
belt statute; wrongful death damages; and survival damages. Any of these
matters could have yielded a vigorous reverse-Erie argument between the
litigants. None did, and the third circuit did not address any such matters.
In assessing the force of the modern reverse-Erie doctrine, it should also be
noted that courts around the country have generally agreed that the parties to
particular transactions can often choose the applicable law. Of course, it is clear
that parties cannot by agreement, stipulation, or waiver confer admiralty
jurisdiction on an incompetent federal court,'0 7 nor can the parties confer
jurisdiction on a state court as to matters committed to the exclusive jurisdiction
of federal tribunals.'0 8 However, there is considerable freedom to choose the
applicable law. Courts have allowed parties to non-maritime disputes to agree
to a binding stipulation that maritime law should govern the dispute,'" 9 and
102. See Green v. Industrial Helicopters, Inc., 593 So. 2d 634, 638 (La.) ("[A] Louisiana state
court should respect Louisiana law unless there is some federal impediment to application of that law
contained in federal legislation or a clearly applicable rule in the general maritime law."), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 65 (1992).
103. 614 So. 2d 1346 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993).
104. Id. at 1348.
105. See Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 102 S. Ct. 2654 (1982) (upholding
admiralty jurisdiction as to a collision between a bass boat and a water-ski boat on the Amite River).
See also Sanders v. Placid Oil Co., 861 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding Catahoula Lake is
admiralty water); McFarland v. Justiss Oil Co., 526 So. 2d 1206 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988) (same).
106. See Lander, 614 So. 2d at 1350-51. This feature of Lander is treated infra part IV.C.
107. See, e.g., McCorkle v. First Pa. Banking & Trust Co., 459 F.2d 243 (4th Cir. 1972). See
generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) and the annotations thereunder in the United States Code
Annotated (1992 & Supp. 1995).
108. See International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 106 S. Ct. 1904 (1986)
(holding a labor union could not waive exclusive NLRB jurisdiction in favor of state court
jurisdiction).
109. See Mentor Ins. Co. (U.K.) v. Brannkasse, 996 F.2d 506, 513 (2d Cir. 1993) ("Although
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have allowed parties whose disputes were clearly maritime to choose to have the
matter governed by state law. n1 None of the decisions contain a satisfactory
discussion of why forum jurisdiction constraints are beyond the parties' control,
whereas the dictates of the Supremacy Clause are rather freely waivable. The
distinction is nevertheless well-settled, and the parties' relative freedom to
contract for state law in maritime affairs is yet another reason for believing that
reverse-Erie preemption is a far less robust doctrine than the old Jensen rhetoric
would suggest.
Aside from any stipulation or agreement of the parties, the Louisiana
Supreme Court has occasionally been relatively bold in asserting the applicability
of state law in maritime cases."' In Green v. Industrial Helicopters, Inc.," 2
the supreme court held that the strict liability doctrine of Louisiana Civil Code
article 2317 should be applied in an admiralty case involving an offshore
helicopter crash. In Logan v. Louisiana Dock Co., 3 the court upheld the
applicability of Louisiana's workers' compensation laws to an injury on a
floating drydock. (Logan is a sound modem decision," 4 but the United States
parties cannot confer admiralty jurisdiction by consent, parties in a diversity action may be bound
by their assumption that admiralty law governs."); Fanguy v. Dupre Bros. Constr. Co., 588 So. 2d
1251, 1257 n.6 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1991) (plaintiff's having chosen "to bring this action under general
maritime law and 33 U.S.C.A. § 905(b)" obviated any necessity of considering otherwise potentially
applicable state law), writ denied, 594 So. 2d 892 (1992).
110. See Angelina Casualty Co. v. Exxon Corp., U.S.A., 876 F.2d 40, 41 (5th Cir. 1989)
(containing dictum that parties to a maritime charter can validly contract to have it governed by state
law); Dueringer v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 842 F.2d 127, 130 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding a defendant
had waived ERISA preemption and was hence subject to state law); Heci Exploration Co. v.
Holloway, 862 F.2d 513, 520 (5th Cir.1988) ("[A] preemption defense may be waived when
availability of the defense affects not the forum in which the case is to be heard, but the law which
is to govern resolution of the claim."); Stoot v. Fluor Drilling Servs., Inc., 851 F.2d 1514, 1516 (5th
Cir. 1988) (holding that parties to a maritime contract can stipulate for the applicability of state law);
Rodrigue v. Legros, 563 So. 2d 248, 255 (La. 1990) (holding parties to maritime indemnity contract
could have chosen to contract for the application of Louisiana law); Authement v. Conoco, Inc., 566
So. 2d 640, 644 (La. App. 5th Cir.) (indicating that parties to vessel charter contract could have
contracted for the applicability of state law), writ denied, 569 So. 2d 960 (1990); General Chem.
Corp. v. De La Lastra, 852 S.W.2d 916, 919 (Tex.) (holding a defendant in maritime wrongful death
action waived its federal preemption argument and was hence governed by state law; "preemption
arguments which affect the choice of law, and not the choice of forum, are waivable"), cert.
dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 490 (1993).
111. But see Rodrigue v. Legros, 563 So. 2d 248 (La. 1990) (applying maritime law rather than
conflicting state law to an indemnity provision in a contract providing for the drilling of an oil well
by a vessel in navigable waters).
112. 593 So. 2d 634 (La.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 65 (1992).
113. 541 So. 2d 182 (La.), cert. dismissed, 492 U.S. 939, 110 S. Ct. 30 (1989).
114. Under the current lenient view of the Jensen prohibition, state workers' compensation law
and the federal LHWCA clearly do (and can constitutionally) overlap. See infra part V.C.1.
In a narrower sense, Logan has been legislatively overruled. La. R.S. 23:1035.2 (Supp. 1995)
(effective January 1, 1990), provides: "No compensation shall be payable [under the Louisiana
Workers' Compensation Act] in respect to the disability or death of any employee covered by the
Federal Employer's Liability Act, the Longshoremen's [sic] and Harbor Worker's [sic] Compensation
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justices who joined the 1917 Jensen majority must be spinning in their
graves." 5) And in Miller v. American Dredging Co.,"16 the Louisiana Su-
preme Court vigorously disagreed with several decisions of the federal Fifth
Circuit in holding that state courts in maritime cases are free to follow
Louisiana's law of forum non conveniens even though the federal courts apply
a very different body of forum non conveniens law.'"7  The United States
Supreme Court has recently affirmed American Dredging Co. in a decision that
can be read as a very broad assertion of state court freedom in the area of
procedure generally."
8
As indicated above," 9 the oft-maligned but nevertheless indispensable
substance-procedure distinction is typically used in general descriptions of
maritime law's reverse-Erie doctrine. Roughly speaking, the thoughtis that in
the substantive realm there is some room for state law supplementation of the
federal maritime law, whereas in the procedural realm, the state courts are free
to go their own way. Provided one is sufficiently wary of the difficulties of
distinguishing substance from procedure, the general dichotomy is a useful
organizing principle. As Justice Souter said in his concurrence in American
Dredging Co.:
Act, or any of its extensions, or the Jones Act." Presumably La. R.S. 23:1035.2 precludes only the
receipt of Louisiana workers' compensation benefits by the indicated workers. It clearly does not
mean Louisiana courts lack jurisdiction to hear cases involving matters that may fall under the
indicated federal regimes. See Moss v. Dixie Mach., Welding & Metal Works, Inc., 617 So. 2d 959,
960 (La. App. 4th Cir.). writ denied, 620 So. 2d 845, cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 469 (1993). Nor does
it prevent a worker covered by the LHWCA from bringing a state-law intentional tort or retaliatory
discharge suit in state court against the employer. Id. at 962. See generally infra part V.C.
115. Given the generally accepted validity of cases like Logan, it is not very clear just what the
Jensen doctrine does currently prohibit in the worker-injury field. Presumably Jensen still stands for
federal preemption on its own facts-an injury to a traditional longshoreman incurred on a vessel
afloat on navigable water. And Jensen also presumably continues to mean a true seaman cannot
constitutionally be subjected to a state workers' compensation regime. See Dupre v. Otis Eng'g
Corp., 641 F.2d 229, 232 n.4 (5th Cir. 1981); Higgins v. State, 627, So. 2d 217, 220 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1993), writ denied, 634 So. 2d 374 (1994); Bearden v. Leon C. Breaux Towing Co., 365 So. 2d
1192, 1194 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978), writ denied, 366 So. 2d 915 (1979); Apperson v. Universal
Servs., Inc., 153 So. 2d 81, 86 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
116. 595 So. 2d 615 (La. 1992), afftd, 114 S. Ct. 981 (1994).
117. In the normal course of things Louisiana courts look to the federal Fifth Circuit for
leadership in making and interpreting maritime law. See, e.g., Barks v. Magnolia Marine Transp. Co.,
617 So. 2d 192, 196 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 620 So. 2d 876 (1993). But cases like
American Dredging Co. make it clear the state courts are of equal authority with the lower federal
courts in these matters. See also Backhus v. Transit Casualty Co., 549 So. 2d 283, 292 (La. 1989)
(refusing to follow Judge Rubin's decision in Baker v. Raymond Int'l, Inc., 656 F.2d 173 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 983, 102 S. Ct. 2256 (1982), which held the owner of a bareboat
chartered vessel remains responsible for unseaworthy conditions arising during the life of the charter,
because "[tlhe Baker rationale is contrary to the great weight of federal case law"). Only the United
States Supreme Court can authoritatively bind the state courts to a particular maritime interpretation.
118. American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 114 S. Ct. 981 (1994). See also infra notes 130-144 and
accompanying text.
119. See supra part II.C.
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I join in the opinion of the Court [affirming Louisiana's freedom to
follow its own concept of forum non conveniens] because I agree that
in most. cases the characterization of a state rule as substantive or
procedural will be a sound surrogate for the conclusion that would
follow from a more discursive preemption analysis. The distinction
between substance and procedure will, however, sometimes be obscure.
As to those close cases, how a given rule is characterized for purposes
of determining whether federal maritime law pre-empts state law will
turn on whether the state rule unduly interferes with the federal interest
in maintaining the free flow of maritime commerce. 20
IV. SELECTED DIFFICULTIES FROM THE PROCEDURAL REALM
A. Forum Non Conveniens
By 1980, the federal courts had developed a general federal doctrine of
forum non conveniens giving trial judges broad discretion to decline to exercise
their jurisdiction in virtually any case in which trial in another forum was
thought more suitable. 2 ' During the 1980s, several federal Fifth Circuit
decisions held that under the reverse-Erie doctrine, state courts in saving clause
cases were obliged to follow the federal approach to forum non conveniens.22
Noting several indications that the Louisiana courts were not disposed to follow
the federal approach, one federal appellate judge wrote with some vehemence
that "[a]t some point, Louisiana must bend to the federal courts' construction of
federal law."'2
When the reverse-Erie question came before the Louisiana Supreme Court,
Louisiana did not bend. In Miller v. American Dredging Co., 24 Justice
Marcus' opinion for the unanimous court 25 noted that Louisiana has a clear
statutory rule on forum non conveniens;12 6 that the United States Supreme
120. American Dredging Co., 114 S. Ct. at 990 (Souter, J., concurring).
121. See generally David W. Robertson, The Federal Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens: An
Object Lesson in Uncontrolled Discretion, 29 Tex. Int'l L.J. 353 (1994) [hereinafter The Federal
Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens]; David W. Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens in England and
America: A Rather Fantastic Fiction, 103 Law Q. Rev. 398 (1987); David W. Robertson & Paula
K. Speck, Access to State Courts in Transnational Personal Injury Cases: Forum Non Conveniens
and Antisuit Injunctions, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 937 (1990); Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and
the Redundancy of Court-Access Doctrine, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 781 (1985).
122. See Ikospentakis v. Thalassic S.S. Agency, 915 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1990); Camejo v. Ocean
Drilling & Exploration, 838 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 1988); Exxon Corp. v. Chick Kam Choo, 817 F.2d
307 (5th Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 486 U.S. 140, 108 S. Ct. 1684 (1988).
123. Ikospentakis, 915 F.2d at 180.
124. 595 So. 2d 615 (La. 1992), affd, 114 S. Ct. 981 (1994).
125. Id. at 617-18.
126. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 123, the general effect of which is to confine the courts' authority
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Court had treated forum non conveniens as a procedural matter in a 1950 FELA
case; 127 that the reverse-Erie doctrine has generally been interpreted to allow
state courts freedom to apply their own procedural rules and concepts; and that
the lower federal courts in diversity cases have been holding that the Erie rule
itself allows them to follow their own notions of forum non conveniens rather
than deferring to the forum state's rule.22 The Court found the last-mentioned
factor especially persuasive:
Under the so-called "reverse-Erie" doctrine... the forum non conveni-
ens doctrine should not be considered part of the substantive federal
admiralty law in a "saving to suitors" case, any more than the doctrine
is part of the state substantive law for Erie purposes. Further, the
interests of self-regulation, administrative independence, and self-
management which have influenced the federal courts to apply federal
forum non conveniens in diversity cases are equally applicable to the
-[sic] Louisiana's interest (as expressed by our legislature in La.Code
Civ.P. art. 123) in applying the state forum non conveniens rule in
Jones Act/general maritime cases.
29
In other words, Justice Marcus believed what was sauce for the (federal Erie)
goose should be sauce for the (state reverse-Erie) gander.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Louisiana Supreme Court's
American Dredging Co. decision in American Dredging Co. v. Miller,'3" a 7-2
decision. Justice Scalia's opinion for the majority used the old Jensen
shibboleth' as a framework for discussion. He first concluded that
Louisiana's refusal to apply federal forum non conveniens does not work
"material prejudice to [a] characteristic feature of the general maritime law"' 2
because the federal forum non conveniens doctrine is not a characteristic feature
of maritime law; it "did not originate in admiralty or have exclusive application
to dismiss cases for forum non conveniens to FELA cases brought by non-Louisiana plaintiffs based
on events occurring outside Louisiana. Subsection C of Article 123 expressly states that forum non
conveniens is not applicable in Jones Act and general maritime law litigation.
127. See Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1, 71 S. Ct. 1 (1950) (holding Missouri was free
to apply its own forum non conveniens rule in a FELA case).
128. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La., 821 F.2d 1147, 1159 (5th Cir.
1987) (en banc) ("We hold that the interests of the federal forum in self-regulation, in administrative
independence, and in self-management are more important than the disruption of uniformity created
by applying federal forum non conveniens in diversity cases."), vacated on other grounds, 490 U.S.
1032, 109 S. Ct. 1928 (1988).
129. Miller v. American Dredging Co., 595 So. 2d 615, 618 (La. 1992), aftid, 114 S. Ct. 981
(1994) (citations omitted).
130. 114 S. Ct. 981 (1994).
131. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
132. American Dredging Co., 114 S. Ct. at 983 (quoting Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S.
205, 216, 37 S. Ct. 524, 529 (1917)).
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there."' 33  Justice Scalia then concluded that Louisiana's refusal to apply
federal forum non conveniens does not impermissibly "'interfere[] with the
proper harmony and uniformity' of maritime law."'134 The key to Justice
Scalia's reasoning on the "harmony and uniformity" point was the observation
that forum non conveniens "is in two respects quite dissimilar from any other
matter that our opinions have held to be governed by federal admiralty law: it
is procedural rather than substantive, and it is most unlikely to produce uniform
results.'
135
Forum non conveniens was seen by Justice Scalia as clearly procedural
rather than substantive because it is "nothing more or less than a supervening
venue provision." 136 Substantive admiralty rules are generally binding on state
courts, and such matters as burden of proof and affirmative defenses have been
classified as substantive. "Unlike burden of proof ... and affirmative defenses
... forum non conveniens does not bear upon the substantive right to recover,
and is not a rule upon which maritime actors rely in making decisions about
primary conduct-how to manage their business and what precautions to
take."
137
And-in some respects the clinching argument from a functional point of
view-Justice Scalia observed that imposing the federal rule of forum non
conveniens on the states would not produce any appreciable increase in
"harrhony" or "uniformity." "The discretionary nature of the doctrine, combined
with the multifariousness of the factors relevant to its application, ... make
uniformity and predictability of outcome almost impossible."'138
About a month before the United States Supreme Court's decision in
American Dredging Co., the Supreme Court of Texas had decided the forum non
conveniens/reverse-Erie issue oppositely; in Exxon Corp. v. Chick Kam
Choo, 39 the Texas court had held it was obliged to follow the federal forum
non conveniens doctrine in a saving clause case. When American Dredging Co.
was decided, the Chick Kam Choo plaintiff sought and received a rehearing; the
Texas Supreme Court withdrew its earlier opinion and held unanimously-in
accordance with American Dredging Co.-that forum non conveniens is a
procedural doctrine governed by state law in saving clause cases. 4 °
The Texas Supreme Court's unanimous decision on rehearing in Chick Kam
Choo should help put to rest what had been a small but nagging doubt about the
reach of American Dredging Co. The doubt existed because on its facts
American Dredging Co. was not a typical maritime forum non conveniens
133. Id
134. Id. at 987 (quoting Jensen, 244 U.S. at 216, 37 S. Ct. at 529).
135. Id. at 988.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 988-89.
138. Id. at 989.
139. 881 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. 1994).
140. Id. at 304-06.
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dispute. Instead, it was a dispute between domestic litigants-the plaintiff was
a Mississippi resident who had been hurt working on the Delaware River, and
the defendant's forum non conveniens motion maintained that the proper forum
for the case was a Pennsylvania state court. The vast bulk of the maritime forum
non conveniens disputes-including Chick Kam Choo-have not involved
domestic situations but rather contentions that the appropriate place of trial is a
court in a foreign land. So the question arose, was American Dredging Co.
confined to domestic forum non conveniens disputes, leaving the reasoning of the
federal Fifth Circuit (and the Texas Supreme Court on original hearing in Chick
Kam Choo) arguably correct as to international forum non conveniens disputes?
In a strange and perhaps even mischievous' 4' postscript at the end of his
American Dredging Co. opinion-an opinion that was otherwise based on broad
reasoning of equal applicability in the domestic and international con-
texts-Justice Scalia had ostentatiously raised that very question, stating:
Amicus the Solicitor General has urged that we limit our holding, that
forum non conveniens is not part of the uniform law of admiralty, to
cases involving domestic entities. We think it unnecessary to do that.
Since the parties to this suit are domestic entities it is quite impossible
for our holding to be any broader.
42
With the issuance of the unanimous Chick Kam Choo rehearing opinion by
the Texas Supreme Court, one can reasonably hope that Justice Scalia's
postscript will not be interpreted as having limited the principle of American
Dredging Co. The Scalia postscript merely states a jurisprudential truism: A
case's holding cannot possibly be broader than its facts. This truism expresses
no view on whether the principle for which the case stands is so narrowly
limited. In determining that American Dredging Co. controlled its decision in
the transnational Chick Kam Choo case, the Texas Supreme Court looked to the
breadth of the American Dredging Co. majority's reasoning as well as to a
dissenting opinion authored by Justice Kennedy and joined by Justice Thomas.
In that dissent Justice Kennedy indicated the jurisprudential truism is all Justice
Scalia's postscript can sensibly mean. After setting out a detailed argument that
the Court's failure to force the states to follow federal forum non conveniens is
damaging to interstate and international maritime commerce, Justice Kennedy
stated:
The Court does seem to leave open the possibility for a different result
if those who raise the forum non conveniens objection are of foreign
nationality. The Court is entitled, I suppose, to so confine its holding,
141. As the following discussion in the text implies, this author thinks Justice Scalia was merely
rebuking the Solicitor General's perceived officiousness. But the postscript is bound to encourage
some fruitless litigation over the reach of American Dredging Co. Justice Scalia should not have
indulged himself.
142. American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 114 S. Ct. 981, 990 (1994).
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but no part in its reasoning gives hope for a different result in a case
involving foreign parties. The Court's substance-procedure distinction
takes no account of the identity of the litigants, nor does the statement
that forum non conveniens remains "nothing more or less than a
supervening venue provision" ..... The Court ought to face up to the
consequences of its rule in this regard.'43
On rehearing of Chick Kam Choo, the unanimous Texas Supreme Court quoted
Justice Kennedy's language, rejecting any notion that American Dredging Co.
does not control international forum non conveniens disputes.'"
Whatever the ultimate resolution of any remaining doubt about the reverse-
Erie implications of federal forum non conveniens, there can be no doubt that
Justice Scalia's American Dredging Co. opinion is a broad charter of procedural
freedom for state courts in saving clause cases. This message has potential
utility well beyond the forum non conveniens context. The following subsections
will address several procedural areas where American Dredging Co. affords state
courts the opportunity to make great strides toward simplifying and clarifying the
law.
B. Forum Selection Clauses
In the interval between the Louisiana Supreme Court's American Dredging
Co. decision and the United States Supreme Court's affirmance thereof, the
Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal issued two decisions holding forum
selection clauses in employment contracts signed by foreign seamen could be
enforced to defeat jurisdiction in the trial courts in which the seamen sought
relief.'45 Enforcing the forum selection clauses in these cases produced the
same effect as would have been achieved by applying the federal forum non
conveniens doctrine.' 46 The fourth circuit's opinions conveyed disagreement
with the Louisiana Supreme Court's American Dredging Co. resolution and noted
that the United States Supreme Court then had the forum non conven-
143. Id. at 996 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Kennedy's intimation that
in an international case it might be a foreign defendant who urged forum non conveniens dismissal
is too broad. Most foreign defendants escape the reach of the American court on personal
jurisdiction grounds before having to fall back on forum non conveniens. See, e.g., Cadawas v.
Skibsakjeselskapet Storli, 630 So. 2d 289 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1993). The normal international forum
non conveniens case will involve a motion by an American or multinational defendant seeking to
have a case brought by a foreign plaintiff dismissed on the view it should be maintained abroad.
144. See Exxon Corp. v. Chick Kam Choo, 881 S.W.2d 301, 306 n.10 (Tex. 1994).
145. Barcelona v. Sea Victory Maritime, Inc., 619 So. 2d 741 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied,
626 So. 2d 1179 (1993); Prado v. Sloman Neptun Schiffahrts, A.G., 611 So. 2d 691 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1992), writ not considered, 613 So. 2d 986 (1993).
146. Indeed, the Prado court ordered a conditional dismissal of precisely the sort that has
become routine in federal forum non conveniens cases. Prado, 611 So. 2d at 704. See Robertson,
The Federal Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, supra note 121, at 369-71.
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iens/preemption issue under advisement.'47 Evidently the fourth circuit
considered the narrow Louisiana limits on forum non conveniens to constitute a
gap in the applicable law and looked to the forum selection clauses as a way to
fill it. The Louisiana Supreme Court will ultimately have to decide whether such
gap-filling is legitimate. On the analogy of the above discussed decisions, which
disapprove of contractual efforts to confer jurisdiction on incompetent courts or
to defeat the jurisdiction of competent courts, 48 using forum selection clauses
to defeat the exercise of jurisdiction by Louisiana courts appears dubious. Surely
the functional point of American Dredging Co. is that the legislature has
effectively mandated that a Louisiana court having subject matter and in
personam jurisdiction must exercise that jurisdiction to decide the case, except
in the narrowly exceptional areas spelled out in the Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure.'49
C. The Plaintif's Right to Elect Bench or Jury Trial
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1732(6) states:
A trial by jury shall not be available in ... [a] suit on an admiralty or
general maritime claim under federal law that is brought in state court
under a federal "saving to suitors" clause, if the plaintiff has designated
that suit as an admiralty or general maritime claim.
This provision applies to suits filed on orafter September 9, 1988."'0 The
courts have refused to apply it retroactively to actions filed before that date."15
The provision's intent and meaning are quite simple: In the supreme court's
words, the maritime plaintiff "has the right to decide if he wants a jury or non-jury
trial in an admiralty or maritime case that is brought in state court." '52 Rule 9(h)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure affords the same right to the maritime
plaintiff in federal court. Under both the state and federal provisions, the bench
trial versusjury trial election is solely the plaintiff's; the defendant has no say in the
matter. The state-court plaintiff makes the election by specifically pleading that the
case is an admiralty or maritime claim brought in state court under the saving
147. See Barcelona, 619 So. 2d at 743 ("The United States Supreme Court has granted writs on
this [forum non conveniens] issue."); id. at 744 ("Prado is dispositive."). See also Prado, 611 So.
2d at 694 (expressing agreement with the federal forum non conveniens cases and disagreement with
the Louisiana Supreme Court's American Dredging Co. decision, noting that United States Supreme
Court review of American Dredging Co. was being sought, and stating: "[W]e must either remand
this case to the trial court to apply [Philippine law] or transfer it to a foreign forum on a basis as [sic]
other than forum non-conveniens [sic].").
148. See supra notes 107-110 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 126.
150. Lantier v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 614 So. 2d 1346, 1351 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993).
151. See Ford v. McDermott, Inc., 543 So. 2d 1135 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989); Gauchet v.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 541 So. 2d 272 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989).
152. Fox v. Southern Scrap Export Co., 618 So. 2d 844, 846 (La. 1993).
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clause and brought pursuant to Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article
1732(6).' By making that pleading designation, the plaintiff chooses a bench
trial. If the plaintiff wishes a jury trial, she omits the pleading designation.
Pleading the case pursuant to Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1732(6) has
no jurisdictional significance. The case does not thereby become exclusively a
federal admiralty case. It does not become removable to federal court. It is still a
state-court saving clause case. The provision's sole effect is on trial procedure.
Recent decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court, 54 the federal Fifth
Circuit,'55 and the Louisiana Courts of Appeal 56 have settled the foregoing
propositions. These cases have also rejected a range of federal and state constitu-
tional arguments whereby defendants have sought to persuade the courts that
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1732(6) is invalid.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1732(6) thus has a clear meaning,
and the courts have determined there is no constitutional impediment to applying
it. Yet the provision is controversial. It changed long-settled expectations about
the mode of trial in saving clause cases. And to some observers it simply seems too
one-sided, too pro-plaintiff. Perhaps for those reasons, a handful of reported cases
have construed the provision in strangely constricted ways. Each of the following
examples is aberrant in the sense that the weight of the jurisprudence is now firmly
153. See Parker v. Rowan Cos., 599 So. 2d 296, 302 (La.) (Dennis, J., concurring), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 203 (1992).
154. See Fox v. Southern Scrap Export Co., 618 So. 2d 844 (La. 1993) (stating the article gives
a plaintiff an exclusive right to elect as between bench and jury trial); Parker v. Rowan Cos., 599 So.
2d 296 (La.) (holding that the article's language "admiralty or general maritime claim" includes Jones
Act claims; that Jones Act claims are brought in state court pursuant to the saving clause; and that
therefore Jones Act plaintiffs have the same election under the article as other maritime plaintiffs),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 203 (1992).
155. See Linton ,. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 964 F.2d 1480 (5th Cir.) (stating that cases
in which the plaintiff makes the Article 1732(6) designation do not thereby become removable to
federal court), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 467 (1992). See also Bergeron v. Quality Shipyards, Inc., 765
F. Supp. 321 (E.D. La. 1991); Cantrelle v. Kiva Constr. & Eng'g, Inc., 630 So. 2d 265 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1993).
156. See Cantrelle, 630 So. 2d at 270 (stating that neither in Jones Act nor in general maritime
law cases does the Article 1732(6) designation divest the state court of jurisdiction or make the case
removable to federal court); Lantier v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 614 So. 2d 1346, 1351 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1993) (stating that Article 1732(6) "duplicates the language of Federal Rule 9(h), [which] was
enacted to give the plaintiff the exclusive right to control whether to have a jury trial"); Roy v. Dixie
Carriers, Inc., 600 So. 2d 814, 817 (La. App. 3d Cir.) (holding a plaintiff can choose a jury trial
simply by omitting to plead the case as admiralty or maritime within the meaning of Article 1732(6)),
writ denied, 604 So. 2d 1307 (1992); Hae Woo Youn v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 605 So. 2d 187,
195 (La. App. 5th Cir.) (rejecting state and federal constitutional attacks on Article 1732(6)), writ
denied, 609 So. 2d 240 (1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2342, modified on other grounds, 623 So.
2d 1257 (La. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1059 (1994); Sons v. Inland Marine Serv., Inc., 577 So.
2d 225, 229 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991) (rejecting state and federal constitutional attacks); Heinhuis v.
Venture Assocs., Inc., 558 So. 2d 1244, 1246 (La. App. 1st Cir.) (stating that Article 1732(6), "the
equivalent of Rule 9(h) in the federal court system," covers Jones Act and general maritime claims
alike), writs denied, 559 So. 2d 1369, 1385 (1990).
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to the contrary. The examples are nevertheless worth including as a cautionary note
about potential judicial attitudes toward Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article
1732(6). (1) For a while the courts took the view that Jones Act claims were not
subject to the provision.5 7 The supreme court's decision in Parker v. Rowan
Cos.15 8 has now settled that Jones Act claims are fully subject to Article
1732(6).159 (2) Two intermediate appellate decisions have held that regardless
of the plaintiff's pleading, state court plaintiffs have no jury trial right in cases that
are fully governed by the substantive general maritime law.16° By granting a per
curiam reversal in one of those cases, 16 the supreme court has indicated that
viewpoint is erroneous. It is contradicted by other intermediate appellate
courts 62 and implicitly but clearly by the supreme court's Parker decision.
Under the weight of authority on the point, a state court plaintiff has always had a
jury trial right in general maritime law cases. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
article 1732(6) did not take that right away, but added to it; it gave the plaintiff the
additional right to plead the case in such a way as to choose a bench trial at the
plaintiff's exclusive option. It cannot be correct that a plaintiff can inadvertently
make the bench trial choice simply by relying on substantive maritime law. Justice
Dennis has urged plaintiffs' counsel to make their intentions clear. If the bench
trial option is being exercised, the plaintiff should plead: "This is an admiralty or
general maritime law claim brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333, the saving to
suitor's [sic] clause, and [Article] 1732(6). '63 If the jury trial mode is being
chosen, the plaintiff's pleading should omit those specific references. (3) Two
courts have stated that under the governing law before the effective date of
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1732(6), a state-court plaintiff in a
157. See Fontenot v. Zapata Gulf Marine Corp., 566 So. 2d 377, 377 (La. 1990) (Marcus and
Lemmon, JJ., dissenting from a writ denial and indicating Article 1732(6) did not apply to Jones Act
claims); Gauchet v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 541 So. 2d 272, 272 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989) (containing
dictum that Jones Act claims are not covered by Article 1732(6)). On the original hearing in Parker
v. Rowan Cos., 628 So. 2d 1108 (La. 1991), the supreme court held Jones Act claims were not
covered by Article 1732(6). On rehearing, Parker v. Rowan Cos., 599 So. 2d 296 (La.), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 203 (1992), the court came firmly to the opposite view, settling the point. See infra note
158.
158. 599 So. 2d 296 (La.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 203 (1992). See also the companion case,
Briley v. Rowan Cos., 599 So. 2d 303 (La.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 203 (1992).
159. Note the potential confusion created by West Publishing Company. The Supreme Court's
controlling Parker opinion-the rehearing opinion issued on May 26, 1992-is reported at 599 So.
2d 296. The original and now discredited opinion (December 2, 1991) is reported at 628 So. 2d
1108.
160. See Armstrong v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 609 So. 2d 1173 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1992), rev'd per curiam, 612 So. 2d 71 (1993); Birden v. Dravo Mechling Corp., 560 So. 2d 605
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1990).
161. See Armstrong v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 609 So. 2d 1173 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1992), rev'd per curiam, 612 So. 2d 71 (1993).
162. See Roy v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 600 So. 2d 814 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 604 So.
2d 1307 (1992).
163. Parker, 599 So. 2d at 302 (Dennis, J., concurring).
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maritime case had a right to jury trial only if the case could have been brought in
federal court on the basis of its diversity jurisdiction.'" This viewpoint seems to
be based on a misinterpretation of a passage in the supreme court's influential
decision in Lavergne v. Western Co. of North America,6 5 where the court was
talking about federal court saving clause cases, not state court saving clause
cases.16
D. Prejudgment Interest
The federal courts have developed a potentially confusing body of rules
concerning awards of prejudgment interest. The state courts-operating on the
assumption that the reverse-Erie doctrine obligates them to try to follow the federal
courts on this matter-have added to the confusion by interpreting the somewhat
contradictory federal pronouncements 67 in occasionally eccentric ways. The
resulting picture is far from clear and orderly.
The state courts could remedy the problem by reexamining their reverse-Erie
assumption. Under the United States Supreme Court's decision in American
Dredging Co., a matter as plausibly procedural as the method of calculating
prejudgment interest could be governed by state-law rules without offending the
Constitution's Supremacy Clause or any other federal preemption doctrine.'68 It
164. See Lantier v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 614 So. 2d 1346, 1351 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993);
Ford v. McDermott, Inc., 543 So. 2d 1135, 1136 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989).
165. 371 So. 2d 807, 809-10 (La. 1979) (holding that state-court maritime plaintiffs have a right
to trial by jury).
166. As indicated supra part 1I.B, the general effect of 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1988) is to make
federal court admiralty jurisdiction exclusive as to actions in rem and selected other types of actions
but (via the saving clause) to leave most maritime plaintiffs free to pursue their actions in non-
admiralty courts (sometimes called "saving clause courts"). The provision'itself has no bearing on
the subject matter jurisdiction requirements of the particular saving clause court selected by the
plaintiff. If the saving clause plaintiff selects a state court, she must satisfy its subject matter
jurisdiction requirements. If she selects the "law side" of the federal court, she must satisfy the
subject matter jurisdictional requirements of that court. The Lavergne passage in question was a
discussion of the requirements for taking a saving clause case to the law side of federal court on the
basis of diversity jurisdiction. The court was not stating or implying Louisiana state courts have
adopted the requisites of federal diversity jurisdiction as criteria for granting a jury trial in maritime
matters.
167. See the reference to "our somewhat conflicting precedents" in Wyatt v. Penrod Drilling Co.,
735 F.2d 951, 956 (5th Cir. 1984). See also infra notes 174-176.
168. See American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 114 S. Ct. 981 (1994). Monessen S.W. Ry. v.
Morgan, 486 U.S. 330, 108 S. Ct. 1837 (1988), is not contrary authority. On the view that the FELA
completely disallows prejudgment interest, Monessen S.W. Ry. held that a Pennsylvania state court
erred in entering an award including such interest. Monessen S.W. Ry. turned centrally on the Court's
construction of the FELA. See Louise Weinberg, The Federal-State Conflict of Laws: "Actual"
Conflicts, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 1743, 1784-96 (1992). Note the state third circuit decision giving rise to
the Louisiana courts' perceived obligation to follow maritime prejudgment interest rules characterized
the prejudgment interest issue as a "seemingly. procedural" matter that the court believed had been
artificially classified as substantive by the federal courts. Morris v. Transworld Drilling Co., 365 So.
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would be far clearer (and on balance somewhat fairer) for state courts to follow
their normal approach to prejudgment interest in all saving clause cases.
1. The Federal Court Picture in a Nutshell
a. Bench Trials
Courts routinely award interest from the date of injury in all maritime cases
tried without juries under the federal courts' admiralty jurisdiction.
As a general rule, prejudgment interest should be awarded in admiralty
cases-not as a penalty, but as compensation for the use of funds to which
the claimant was rightfully entitled. Discretion to deny prejudgment
interest is created only when there are "peculiar circumstances" that would
make it inequitable for the losing party to be forced to pay prejudgment
interest. 169
It has been held to be reversible error for a trial judge to limit prejudgment interest
by awarding it only from the date of judicial demand rather than from the date of
the injury. 70
Of course, prejudgment interest should not be awarded on items of damages
for future losses, but only on that portion of the judgment representing losses
occurring before the judgment.'' As one court recently explained:
We have held on numerous occasions that awards of prejudgment interest
on future damages are not available, for the common-sense reason that
those damages compensate future harm, for which no interest could
possibly have accrued before trial.'
72
When a Jones Act case is tried without a jury, it is subject to the same
prejudgment interest rules as any other bench-tried admiralty case: On the portion
of the damages representing past injuries, prejudgment interest should be awarded
from the date of the injury.173
2d 46, 47 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978). See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
169. Noritake Co. v. MNV Hellenic Champion, 627 F.2d 724, 728 (5th Cir. 1980) (involving a
COGSA bench trial) (citation omitted). See also Pickle v. International Oilfield Divers, Inc., 791
F.2d 1237, 1240 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1059, 107 S. Ct. 939 (1987) (stating in
admiralty bench trials, judges should award prejudgment interest absent peculiar circumstances).
170. Reeled Tubing, Inc. v. MN Chad G, 794 F.2d 1026, 1028-29 (5th Cir. 1986) (involving
a property damage bench trial).
171. Snyder v. Whittaker Corp., 839 F.2d 1085, 1095 (5th Cir. 1988) (involving a products
liability jury trial); Williams v. Reading & Bates Drilling Co., 750 F.2d 487, 491 (5th Cir. 1985)
(involving a Jones Act bench trial).
172. Verdin v. C&B Boat Co., 860 F.2d 150, 158 (5th Cir. 1988) (involving a Jones Act and
general maritime law bench trial). See also Pickle, 791 F.2d at 1241.
173. See Verdin v. C&B Boat Co., 860 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1988); Williams v. Reading & Bates
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b. Jury Trials in Maritime Cases Not Involving the Jones Act
When (by way of the saving clause) a maritime case is tried on the "law side"
of federal court, resulting in jury trial, the proper approach to prejudgment interest
is less clear. Indeed, the federal Fifth Circuit decisions appear to conflict on the
matter. In 1981, one panel of the Fifth Circuit held that in such a case arising in
Louisiana, prejudgment interest from the date of judicial demand is proper under
the Louisiana rule,'74 but generally only if it is assessed by the jury rather than the
judge.7 5 In 1988-without mentioning the earlier case-another panel held that
the trial judge could award prejudgment interest from the date of the injury under
the maritime law rule.
176
c. Jury Trials in Jones Act Cases
When a Jones Act case is tried to a federal jury, prejudgment interest is
disallowed. 7 7 This is true even though the plaintiff may have joined a general
maritime law claim to his Jones Act claim, except in the relatively rare event that
a clearly separate recovery has been had on the non-Jones Act portion of the
case. 
78
The rule prohibiting prejudgment interest in Jones Act jury cases is an
anomaly. Various explanations have been offered for it.179 The clearest was set
forth in Judge Rubin's opinion in Barton v. Zapata Offshore Co.:"s°
The first F.E.L.A. was enacted in 1906, when pre-judgment interest was
generally limited to liquidated claims. This distinction was carried over
into decisions under the Jones Act, perhaps with good reason in view of
the latter statute's express incorporation of F.E.L.A. provisions. Both
Drilling Co., 750 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1985).
174. Havis v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 664 F.2d 54, 55-56 (5th Cir. 1981) (involving a
diversity action for injuries to a passenger in a maritime helicopter crash). The Havis opinion clearly
stated interest was to be allowed under the Louisiana rule. However, a later opinion states Havis held
"that federal, not state, law governs an admiralty plaintiff's entitlement to prejudgment interest even
though the plaintiff may have invoked diversity jurisdiction in his complaint." Wyatt v. Penrod
Drilling Co., 735 F.2d 951, 955 (5th Cir. 1984).
175. See the story of the later unpublished "clarifying" opinion in Havis as told in Morris v.
Schlumberger, Ltd., 436 So. 2d 1178, 1182-85 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 441 So. 2d 1221
(1983).
176. Snyder v. Whittaker Corp., 839 F.2d 1085, 1093-95 (5th Cir. 1988) (involving a diversity
action for deaths of crewmen of sunken boat against boat manufacturer). Wyatt v. Penrod Drilling
Co., 735 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1984), also suggests the proper rule is the maritime law rule rather than
state law. (Note that Snyder was written by Judge Sam Johnson, who had been a member of the
Havis panel).
177. Wyatt, 735 F.2d at 955-56; Theriot v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 742 F.2d 877, 883 (5th
Cir. 1984).
178. See Wyatt, 735 F.2d at 956.
179. See, e.g., Snyder, 839 F.2d at 1094.
180. 397 F. Supp. 778, 779-80 (E.D. La. 1975) (citations omitted).
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statutes provided for an action at law, with right to trial by jury, although
Jones Act suits could also be brought in admiralty. Both statutes
envisaged a recovery for pain and suffering and for injuries to the date of
trial and thereafter, the computation of interest on which might well be far
more confusing to the average jury than to a judge.... In any event, no
one would be so naive as to suppose that juries do not throw into the
scales the years that a plaintiff may have had to wait before his case can
be heard by ajury. The practical reason why the courts injury cases have
refused to grant moratory interest may therefore be found in the judicial
recognition that a jury usually makes some allowance for loss caused by
delay.
On this view, prejudgment interest would amount to a double penalty and therefore
should not be allowed. Of course, the explanation does not tell why other types of
maritime personal injury cases tried to federal juries can properly yield prejudg-
ment interest awards. Judge Rubin explained the anomalous Jones Act rule, but not
the anomaly itself. The federal courts' distinction between Jones Act cases tried
to juries and other maritime personal injury cases tried to juries seems to lack a
principled justification.
d. Summary
In summary, here is what I believe to be the current federal-court picture: (1)
Bench trials (including Jones Act cases): Prejudgment interest is awarded on all
past-loss portions of the award, running from the date of the injury. (2) Jury trials
other than Jones Act cases: Prejudgment interest can be awarded on past-loss
portions of the award, running from the date of the injury. Generally the jury
decides the prejudgment interest issue. Probably the trial judge has more discretion
than in bench trials. Perhaps there is more room for argument than in bench trials
about the proper role of state rules regarding prejudgment interest. (3) Jones Act
jury trials: No prejudgment interest is allowed. The prohibition includes cases in
which Jones Act claims are joined with general maritime law claims, with the
possible exception that prejudgment interest might lie on past-loss portions of any
part of the award clearly based on some liability ground other than the Jones Act.
2. The State Courts' View that They Must Follow the Federal Courts
Evidently the earliest Louisiana state court case holding that state courts are
obliged to follow the federal prejudgment interest rules in Jones Act cases was
the third circuit's 1978 decision in Morris v. Transworld Drilling Co.'8' As
authority for this view, the third circuit cited only a New Jersey FELA case
181. 365 So. 2d 46, 47 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
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(which itself mentioned no maritime authorities)" 2 and a treatise that had
purportedly identified "a trend by the United States Supreme Court to narrow the
area of the law which is deemed procedural and thereby to shrink the number of
instances in which state law, as the law of the forum, will apply."' 1 3  As
indicated above, 84 the existence or applicability in the present context of any
such trend is shown to be unlikely by the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in American Dredging Co. v. Miller.8 5 I believe the state courts could
clearly follow their own rules and procedures on prejudgment interest without
running afoul of any Supremacy Clause or other federal limitations. It should
be noted that the Louisiana Supreme Court has apparently never put its
imprimatur on the view that the federal prejudgment interest practices bind state
courts.
The view that state courts must follow federal prejudgment interest rules in
maritime cases not involving the Jones Act has proven untraceable. This
assumption seems to have been carried forward, along with the Morris rule
respecting prejudgment interest under the Jones Act, without serious challenge
or close scrutiny. It is time for such scrutiny because the state courts' efforts to
follow the federal courts' lead on prejudgment interest issues have led to a welter
of confusion.
3. State Court Rulings on Prejudgment Interest in Bench-Tried Cases
In bench-tried cases-including Jones Act as well as general maritime law
cases-the prevailing view in the state courts has been faithful to the federal
approach: Prejudgment interest should ordinarily be awarded from the date of
injury, and it should be limited to the past-loss portions of the award. 186 But
there are many divergent views. At least one court has held that prejudgment
interest can not be awarded in any Jones Act case, including a bench-tried
case. 8 7 Others have held that prejudgment interest can be awarded in Jones
Act cases only when the claim invokes general maritime law as well as the Jones
182. See Wicks v. Central R.R., 322 A.2d 488 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), writ denied, 331 A.2d
17 (1974).
183. Morris, 365 So. 2d at 47 (citation omitted).
184. See supra notes 130-144 and accompanying text.
185. 114 S. Ct. 981 (1994).
186. See Theriot v. McDermott, Inc., 611 So. 2d 129, 136 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1992), writ denied,
615 So. 2d 342 (1993); Hae Woo Youn v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 605 So. 2d 187, 204 (La. App.
5th Cir.), writ denied, 609 So. 2d 240 (1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2342, modified on other
grounds, 623 So. 2d 1257 (La. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1059 (1994); Spangler v. North Star
Drilling Co., 552 So. 2d 673, 685 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989). Note Theriot and Hae Woo Youn do not
make clear whether prejudgment interest was awarded from injury or from judicial demand.
However, both courts stated they were applying the federal rule, which has the interest running from
injury. Spangler made the matter clear, as did a number of other opinions.
187. Foret v. Terrebonne Towing Co., 632 So. 2d 344, 349 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993).
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Act, and then only at the full discretion of the trial judge.'88 Some courts have
measured the prejudgment interest from the date of judicial demand rather than
from the date of injury.' 89 One court has held prejudgment interest in bench-
tried unseaworthiness cases should be awarded on all portions of the award, not
just the past-loss portions.'9 And among the courts that acknowledge the
general inappropriateness of awarding prejudgment interest on future-loss items,
there is an acknowledged split of authority 9' on whether prejudgment interest
is precluded for all future-loss portions of the award' 92 or only for future non-
economic damages, i.e., future pain and suffering. 193 (The view that prejudg-
ment interest can properly be awarded for future economic losses seems difficult
to justify in principle. It seems to have originated in a 1988 Louisiana Third
Circuit Court of Appeal opinion that arguably misread a cryptic opinion of the
federal Fifth Circuit. 194)
Barks v. Magnolia Marine Transport Co. 95 was a bench-tried Jones Act
and general maritime law case that illustrates a fairly typical tangle. The trial
judge awarded prejudgment interest from the date of judicial demand on all items
of recovery, including future damages. The court of appeal stated this was
wrong in two respects: interest should have run from the date of injury, but on
the other hand it should probably have been limited to past-loss items (or at the
very least it should not have included prejudgment interest on future pain and
suffering). The court of appeal went on to state:
It is not necessary in the present case that we take sides on this
difference of opinion [as to whether prejudgment interest is proper on
the future economic loss portions of the award]. There are circumstanc-
188. See, e.g., Theriot, 611 So. 2d at 136; Danos v. McDermott Inc., 563 So. 2d 968, 973 (La.
App. 1st Cir.), writ not considered, 566 So. 2d 386 (1990).
189. See Barks v. Magnolia Marine Transp. Co., 617 So. 2d 192, 196 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ
denied, 620 So. 2d 876 (1993); McFarland v. Justiss Oil Co., 526 So. 2d 1206, 1215-16 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1988).
190. Corliss v. Elevating Boats, Inc., 599 So. 2d 434, 438-39 (La. App. 4th Cit. 1992).
191. Cases discussing the split include Barks, 617 So. 2d at 196, and Spangler v. North Star
Drilling Co., 552 So. 2d 673, 685 (La. App. 2d Cit. 1989).
192. See the cases cited supra note 186.
193. Cases allowing prejudgment interest for future economic losses include Gray v. Texaco,
Inc., 610 So. 2d 1090, 1097 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992), writs denied, 616 So. 2d 686, 687 (1993);
Babineaux v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 608 So. 2d 659, 664 (La. App. 3d Cit. 1992), writ denied, 610
So. 2d 819 (1993); McFarland, 526 So. 2d at 1215-16.
194. See McFarland, 526 So. 2d at 1215-16, reading Pickle v. International Oilfield Divers, Inc.,
791 F.2d 1237 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1059, 107 S. Ct. 939 (1987), as validating the
future economic versus future non-economic distinction. The Pickle court, however, appeared not
to be accepting the validity of the distinction, but only pointing out that the trial judge's error in
awarding prejudgment interest on future-loss portions of the award was easy to correct as to the
future economic losses, because that portion of the judgment was "clearly identifiable," whereas
remand was necessary to correct the error as to the future non-economic losses, because the judgment
did not differentiate as between past and future pain and suffering. Id. at 1241 & n.4.
195. 617 So. 2d 192 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 620 So. 2d 876 (1993).
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es when a trial court may exercise its discretion to award prejudgment
interest only [from] the date of judicial demand. We conclude that the
trial judge properly exercised its discretion in the present case. If we
consider post-judgment damages to include pecuniary damages found
by the trial court, the post-judgment and prejudgment damages are about
equal. The trial judge could have awarded prejudgment interest on past
damages from the date of the accident, and could have denied post-
judgment interest altogether. By making all damages subject to interest,
but dating only from judicial demand, the result is fair and certainly not
an abuse of the trial court's discretion.'
The court's solution is attractive in its simplicity. We should resist the urge for
infinite fine-tuning in these cases. Holding that prejudgment interest runs on the
entire award from date of judicial demand may lack logical elegance, but it is a
sensible, middle-of-the-road approach that seems workable.
197
4. State Court Rulings on Prejudgment Interest Issues in Jury-Tried
Cases
In Jones Act cases tried to juries, the state courts follow the federal rule
precluding the award of prejudgment interest. 9 8 That is about the only matter on
which the courts agree. As to virtually every other conceivable issue, there is
discord in the case law. Thejury trial decisions exhibit the same unacknowledged
split as the bench-tried cases on whether, when prejudgment interest is available,
it should run from the date of judicial demand or from the date of injury.'99 There
is also the same debate about the propriety of prejudgment interest on future
economic loss damages.200 And there are a number of debatable areas involving
the judge-jury allocation. For example, in cases not involving the Jones Act, some
.196. Id. at 196. The court actually wrote: "There are circumstances when a trial court may
exercise its discretion to award prejudgment interest only to the date of judicial demand." (Emphasis
added.) It is clear from the context, however, the court meant "from."
197. For a less defensible "split-the-difference" response to the tangle of perceived rules in this
area, see Mistich v. Pipelines, Inc., 609 So. 2d 921, 941 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992), writ denied, 613
So. 2d 996, cert. denied sub nom. Brown & Root, Inc. v. Mistich, 113 S. Ct. 3020 (1993), in which
the court of appeal upheld the trial judge's arbitrary allocation of half the award to unseaworthiness
and half to the Jones Act and the consequent determination to award prejudgment interest (whether
from judicial demand or from injury does not appear from the opinion) on half the award.
198. See Rains v. Diamond M. Co., 396 So. 2d 306, 313 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 399
So. 2d 623 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938, 102 S. Ct. 1427 (1982); Morris v. Transworld Drilling
Co., 365 So. 2d 46, 47 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
199. See, e.g., Ronquillo v. Belle Chase Marine Transp., Inc., 629 So. 2d 1359 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1993) (reversing, for other reasons, the trial judge's award of prejudgment interest from judicial
demand).
200. See Savoie v. McCall's Boat Rentals, Inc., 491 So. 2d 94, 107 (La. App. 3d Cir.) (reversing
entire prejudgment interest award when it could not be determined how much of it related to future-
loss items), writs denied, 494 So. 2d 334, 542 (1986).
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courts apparently hold that only the jury can award prejudgment interest-that to
be valid it must be part of the verdict2°-while others appear to approve the trial
judge's adding it to the verdict.2 °2 In cases involving combined Jones Act and
general maritime law claims, courts seem to generally agree that the jury must
determine the prejudgment interest issue.20 3 But in these combined Jones Act and
general maritime law cases, some courts have doubted that prejudgment interest can
ever be awarded. 2" Other courts hold that prejudgment interest can be awarded
provided the jury is properly instructed to and does (a) apportion the recovery as
between the Jones Act and the general maritime law grounds, and (b) award
prejudgment interest limited to the non-Jones Act portions. 0 5
5. A Simple Proposal
The foregoing creates too much confusion, entailing too much judicial effort
on a decidedly peripheral issue. The state courts should reexamine the assumption
that there is a federal constitutional obligation to follow the federal courts on these
matters. If state courts abandoned the assumption, they would be free to follow the
sensible Barks approach in all cases.20° The Louisiana courts should heed the
message of procedural freedom the United States Supreme Court's American
Dredging Co. opinion has delivered and use that freedom to treat all prejudgment
interest issues alike: Interest should be awarded by the trial judge, not thejury, and
it should run from judicial demand on all items of damages.0"
E. Appellate Review
Issues as to the proper scope of appellate review routinely arise in three broad
matters: (1) liability or merits issues in Jones Act cases; (2) liability or merits
issues in other types of maritime cases; and (3) quantum issues. On each of these
matters, the Louisiana courts have intermittently tried to follow federal court
standards and have fallen into substantial disagreement among themselves. Again,
the United States Supreme Court's American Dredging Co. decision offers the
201. See Smith v. Two "R" Drilling Co., 606 So. 2d 804, 815 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied,
607 So. 2d 560 (1992).
202. See Smith v. Flotation Servs., Inc., 596 So. 2d 343, 347 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992).
203. See, e.g., Marsh v. Penrod Drilling Co., 619 So. 2d 1124, 1126 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ
denied, 625 So. 2d 180 (1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1068 (1994).
204. See Ellender v. Texaco, Inc., 425 So. 2d 291, 297-98 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
205. See, e.g., Ronquillo v. Belle Chase Marine Transp., Inc., 629 So. 2d 1359, 1364, 1366 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1993); Osorio v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 557 So. 2d 999, 1011 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ
denied, 561 So. 2d 99 (1990); Mihalopoulos v. Westwind Africa Line, Ltd., 511 So. 2d 771, 781 (La.
App. 5th Cir. 1987); Morris v. Schlumberger, Ltd., 436 So. 2d 1178, 1180 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ
denied, 441 So. 2d 1221 (1983).
206. See supra notes 195-197 and accompanying text.
207. See Corliss v. Elevating Boats, Inc., 599 So. 2d 434, 438 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992) (stating
that under state law, interest runs from judicial demand on all items).
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opportunity for an attractive solution: Let all these matters be governed by the
normal state rules.
1. Liability (Merits) Issues in Jones Act Cases
In its 1971 decision in Trahan v. Gulf Crews, Inc.,208 the Louisiana Supreme
Court said that merits review in Jones Act cases is "necessarily" the same as in the
federal courts. The court principally relied upon FELA cases to support that
supposed compulsion. However, as Justice Dixon demonstrated in his Trahan
dissent, those cases did not hold that state courts are obligated to follow federal
standards of appellate review.2 The Trahan majority appeared to have misread
them.
*Having thus more or less assumed that state courts are obliged to follow the
federal review standards, the Trahan majority opinion then articulated two
distinctly different federal standards, without giving any clear indication as to
which one was controlling: (1) "Louisiana appellate courts... may not... disturb
the finding of a trial jury on the merits in [Jones Act] cases unless there is no
reasonable basis for the jury's conclusion [in favor of the plaintiff;] 2'0 or (2)
"Only when there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the conclusion
reached (by the jury in plaintiff's favor) does a reversible error appear. ' '21
Not surprisingly, the lower courts have divided (without any acknowledgment
of the split of authority) as between those two review standards. Perhaps such a
division is not of supreme importance; practitioners often observe that articulated
standards of appellate review seem to have little to do with the degree of scrutiny
an appellate court will actually apply in any given case. But the disagreement is
potentially confusing and not trivial: The "complete absence of probative facts"
standard describes a much more limited appellate function than the "no reasonable
basis" standard.
The "no reasonable basis" standard seems to have a slight numerical advantage
in the reported cases,"' but the "complete absence of probative facts" standard
also has made a strong showing.2 a And these are not the only two views. In a
208. 260 La. 29, 39-40, 255 So. 2d 63, 66-67 (1971).
209. Id. at 54-57, 255 So. 2d at 72-75 (Dixon, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 40, 255 So. 2d at 67.
211. Id. at 42, 255 So. 2d at 67 (quoting Lavender v. Kum, 327 U.S. 645, 652, 66 S. Ct. 740,
743 (1946)).
212. See Barks v. Magnolia Marine Transp. Co., 617 So. 2d 192, 194 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ
denied, 620 So. 2d 876 (1993); Seymour v. CIGNA Ins. Co., 622 So. 2d 839, 843 (La. App. 5th
Cir.), writ denied, 629 So. 2d 1136 (1993); Simmons v. Hope Contractors, Inc., 517 So. 2d 333, 338
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1987), writ denied, 518 So. 2d 510 (1988); Savoie v. McCall's Boat Rentals, Inc.,
491 So. 2d 94, 103 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writs denied, 494 So. 2d 334, 542 (1986); Ellender v. Texaco,
Inc., 425 So. 2d 291, 294 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982); Rains v. Diamond M. Co., 396 So. 2d 306, 309
(La. App. 3d Cir.), writ refused, 399 So. 2d 623 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938, 102 S. Ct. 1427
(1982).
213. See Daigle v. Coastal Marine, Inc., 488 So. 2d 679, 681 (La. 1986); Mistich v. Pipelines,
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third group of decisions, the courts have stated that the proper standard is the
federal "clearly erroneous" rule.2"4
Finally, there is an emerging fourth view: appellate review in Jones Act cases
should be conducted in accordance with normal state law rules. The Louisiana
Supreme Court may have hinted a preference for that approach in its 1986 per
curiam opinion in Daigle v. Coastal Marine, Inc.,215 and several courts of appeal
have since recognized the hint, either holding or suggesting that ordinary state
procedures should govern these matters.1 6 At the time those cases were decided,
the only supportive authority from the United States Supreme Court was dictum in
Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington 7 that "state courts are not required to apply
Rule 52(a) [the federal 'clearly erroneous' rule] to their own appellate system for
reviewing factual determinations of trial courts." 2 8 That dictum was rather frail
authority, inasmuch as Icicle Seafoods, Inc. was neither a maritime case nor a case
that had come through the state courts. But the American Dredging Co. decision
seems to be quite strong maritime authority for state court procedural freedom. The
Daigle hint should be written into firm law.
2. Liability (Merits) Issues in Other Maritime Cases
Several appellate courts have said that the correct review standard for
liability issues in non-Jones Act cases is the "no reasonable basis" rule.219
Inc., 609 So. 2d 921, 928 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992), writ denied, 613 So. 2d 996, cert. denied sub
nom. Brown & Root, Inc. v. Mistich, 113 S. Ct. 3020 (1993); Osorio v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 557
So. 2d 999, 1003 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 561 So. 2d 99 (1990).
214. See Babineaux v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 608 So. 2d 659, 662 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992), writ
denied, 610 So. 2d 819 (1993); McFarland v. Justiss Oil Co., 526 So. 2d 1206, 1209 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1988).
215. 488 So. 2d 679, 681 n.3 (La. 1986):
Even if Trahan controls the standard of review in state court on Jones Act claims, the
standard of review for claims under general maritime law is different. Moreover, "state
courts are not required to apply Rule 52(a) [the clearly erroneous standard of review]-a
rule of federal civil procedure-to their own appellate system for reviewing factual
determinations of trial courts."
(quoting Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 475 U.S. 709, 712, 106 S. Ct. 1527, 1529 (1986)).
216. See Hanks v. Barge Transp. Co., 563 So. 2d 1297, 1300 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied,
569 So. 2d 964 (1990) (holding); Feyerabend v. State Dep't of Wildlife & Fisheries, 544 So. 2d 577,
579-80 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989) (hinting). Cf. Caravalho v. Dual Drilling Servs., Inc., 631 So. 2d
725, 728 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994) (applying state appellate review standard to a Jones Act case
without mentioning Daigle). See also Butler v. Zapata Haynie Corp., 633 So. 2d 1274, 1278-82 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1994). In Butler, Judge Stoker (joined by Chief Judge Domengeaux) dissented on the
merits, but agreed that the state law on appellate review should obtain. Id. at 1291-92 (Stoker, J.,
dissenting). Judge Stoker explicitly relied on Daigle and Icicle Seafoods, Inc. Id. (Stoker, J.,
dissenting) His opinion also discusses the divergent views in other circuits. Id. at 1292-93 (Stoker,
J., dissenting).
217. 475 U.S. 709, 106 S. Ct. 1527 (1986).
218. Id. at 712, 106 S. Ct. at 1529.
219. See Babineaux v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 608 So. 2d 659, 662 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992), writ
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Others have opted for the federal "clearly erroneous" rule.220 But the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court's Daigle opinion in 1986 said that state law should
govern,221 and most of the subsequent court of appeal decisions have fol-
lowed.222 It seems to be the only sensible approach, and American Dredging
Co. gives it great comfort.
3. Quantum Issues
The portion of the Trahan majority opinion most criticized by Justice Dixon
in his dissent stated:
State appellate review of jury awards under maritime law and the Jones
Act is, as in the federal courts, "extremely limited." They must stand
unless the appellate courts find there is no law and no evidence to
sustain them, rendering them, as some courts have put it, so excessive
as to be obviously punitive, motivated by prejudice, passion, partiality,
or corruption."'
Some courts of appeal have attempted to apply that standard.224  Others
have simply conducted quantum review under state standards without com-
denied, 610 So. 2d 819 (1993); Osorio v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 557 So. 2d 999, 1003 (La. App. 4th
Cir.), writ denied, 561 So. 2d 99 (1990); McFarland v. Justiss Oil Co., 526 So. 2d 1206, 1209 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1988).
220. See Basham v. Trinity Indus., 625 So. 2d 290, 291 n.1 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993), writ
denied, 630 So. 2d 787 (1994); Savoie v. McCall's Boat Rentals, Inc., 491 So. 2d 94, 103 (La. App.
3d Cir.), writs denied, 494 So. 2d 334, 542 (1986); Ellender v. Texaco, Inc., 425 So. 2d 291, 294
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1982). Cf. Helmstetter v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 583 So. 2d 20, 23 (La. App. 4th
Cir.) (using state law manifest error standard, without mentioning Daigle, in reversing bench trial
judgment for defendant in action brought under 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1988)), writ denied, 589 So. 2d
1067 (1991).
221. See supra note 215.
222. See Gaston v. G&D Marine Servs., Inc., 631 So. 2d 547, 552 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ
denied, 635 So. 2d 1112 (1994); Jordan v. Intercontinental Bulktank Corp., 621 So. 2d 1141, 1155
(La. App. 1st Cir.), writs denied, 623 So. 2d 1335, 1336 (1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 926 (1994);
Young v. Armadores de Cabotaje, S.A., 617 So. 2d 517, 525 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writs denied, 625
So. 2d 170, 171 (1993), vacated on other grounds, 114 S. Ct. 2701 (1994); Mistich v. Pipelines, Inc.,
609 So. 2d 921, 928-29 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992), writ denied, 613 So. 2d 996, cert. denied sub nom.
Brown & Root, Inc. v. Mistich, 113 S. Ct. 3020 (1993); Smith v. Two "R" Drilling Co., 606 So. 2d
804, 808 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 607 So. 2d 560 (1992); Hanks v. Barge Transp. Co., 563
So. 2d 1297, 1300 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 569 So. 2d 964 (1990); Bergeron v. Main Iron
Works, Inc., 563 So. 2d 954, 960-61 (La. App. 1st Cir.) (Lanier, J., concurring), writs denied, 569
So. 2d 960, 965 (1990); Feyerabend v. State Dep't of Wildlife & Fisheries, 544 So. 2d 577, 580 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1989); Simmons v. Hope Contractors, Inc., 517 So. 2d 333, 336 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1987), writ denied, 518 So. 2d 510 (1988).
223. Trahan v. Gulf Crews, Inc., 260 La. 29, 49, 255 So. 2d 63, 70 (1971).
224. See Hae Woo Youn v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 605 So. 2d 187, 201 (La. App. 5th Cir.)
(relying on Sutton v. Central Gulf Lines, Inc., 433 So. 2d 888 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983)), writ denied,
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ment. 225 Now that courts review merits issues in general maritime law cases
under normal state standards-and now that there is at least a slight movement
in the same direction as to merits issues in Jones Act cases-certainly courts
may and should review quantum under the normal state law approach.226
F. Summary Proceedings to Obtain Maintenance and Cure?
When a seaman becomes ill or is injured in the course of employment,22 7
the employer owes maintenance (daily subsistence) and cure (medical care). The
employer's maintenance and cure obligation is strict; there are few defenses.
The seaman is entitled to the prompt provision of maintenance and cure. An
employer who unjustifiably withholds or delays these payments will be liable for
compensatory damages to redress any further harm brought about by the delay
as well as punitive damages if the refusal to pay was arbitrary or callous.228
Seamen whose employers have denied, delayed, or prematurely terminated
maintenance and cure benefits sometimes desperately need summaryjudicial relief.
For an ailing and needy seaman, the uncertain prospect of compensatory and
punitive damages down the judicial road may be small solace. The federal courts
will sometimes sever maintenance and cure claims from other issues that may be
in litigation between the seaman and his employer and grant an early trial on the
maintenance and cure portion of the case.229  Federal courts will also grant
summary judgment for the seaman on maintenance and cure issues in appropriate
cases. 230 But "federal maritime law does not mandate a remedy more expeditious
than summary judgment to a plaintiff seeking maintenance and cure. ' 231
609 So. 2d 240 (1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2342, modified on other grounds, 623 So. 2d 1257
(La. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1059 (1994). See also Ellender v. Texaco, Inc., 425 So. 2d 291,
296 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982); Rains v. Diamond M. Co., 396 So. 2d 306, 312 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ
refused, 399 So. 2d 623 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938, 102 S. Ct. 1427 (1982).
225. See Mistich, 609 So. 2d at 939-40.
226. Note some courts have been saying the present state law rule on quantum review is highly
restrictive, entailing "vast discretion" towards the trier of fact. Foret v. Terrebonne Towing Co., 632
So. 2d 344, 350 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1993).
227. The early maintenance and cure jurisprudence phrased the employment-relation component
in terms of "service of the ship." See generally Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523, 76 S. Ct. 608
(1951). The Court later held the "meaning of the term 'course of employment' under the [Jones] Act
... is the equivalent of the 'service of the ship' formula used in maintenance and cure cases." Braen
v. Pfeifer Oil Transp. Co., 361 U.S. 129, 132-33, 80 S. Ct. 247, 249 (1959). For a good discussion
of the service of the ship/course of employment jurisprudence, see Lee v. Mississippi River Grain
Elevator, Inc., 591 So. 2d 1371 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991).
228. The best summary of the law governing the liability of an employer for failing to provide
maintenance and cure is Judge Rubin's influential opinion in Morales v. Garijak, Inc., 829 F.2d 1355
(5th Cir. 1987).
229. See the discussion and citations in Perry v. Allied Offshore Marine Corp., 618 So. 2d 1033,
1036 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993).
230. See, e.g., Freeman v. Thunder Bay Transp. Co., 735 F. Supp. 680 (M.D. La. 1990).
231. Perry, 618 So. 2d at 1036.
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When seamen have sought maintenance and cure by summary proceedings
in Louisiana state courts, some district courts have used the highly expeditious
"rule to show cause" procedure set forth in Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
article 963 to order the employer to make the payments. 232 However, two
Louisiana courts of appeal have concluded Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
article 2592 presents an impediment to that procedure. Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure article 2592 sets forth an eleven-item list of the "only" matters as to
which summary proceedings may be used. Despite the fact at least two of these
eleven items are set forth in quite elastic and general terms, 233 decisions of the
first and third circuits have held that the procedure article precludes the use of
summary proceedings to order the payment of maintenance and cure. 3 Some
judges have suggested that "the Legislature ... should take steps to enable
injured seamen the opportunity to obtain maintenance and cure by summary
proceedings.235  As matters now stand, at least in those two circuits, the
seaman must be content with somewhat slower relief-by way of a motion for
summary judgment after appropriate discovery or for an expedited trial of
severed maintenance and cure claims-and hope that the threat of liability for
compensatory and punitive damages will discourage employer recalcitrance.
V. SOME MATTERS OF SUBSTANTIVE LAW
A. Seaman Statusi
3 6
The established federal maritime law holds (virtually without exception 237)
that a worker must be classified as a seaman to qualify for the protection of the
Jones Act, the doctrine of unseaworthiness, and the law of maintenance and cure.
232. See id. (disapproving of "the long-standing practice in the 16th Judicial District of deciding
issues of maintenance and cure through the use of summary proceedings on rule days").
233. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2592(3) allows summary proceedings to dispose of "[a]n issue which
may be raised properly by an exception, contradictory motion, or rule to show cause." La. Code Civ.
P. art. 2592(11) allows summary proceedings respecting "[a]ll other matters in which the law permits
summary proceedings to be used."
234. See Bourque v. Norman Offshore Pipelines, 634 So. 2d 1363 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994); Perry
v. Allied Offshore Marine Corp., 618 So. 2d 1033 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993); Thurman v. Patton-Tully
Transp. Co., 619 So. 2d 879 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993).
235. Bourque, 634 So. 2d at 1365.
236. See generally David W. Robertson, Continuing Issues in the Rights of Injured Maritime
Workers in the Wilander-Gizoni Era, 24 Rutgers L.J. 443 (1993); David W. Robertson, The Law of
Seaman Status Clarified, 23 J. Mar. L. & Com. 1 (1992); David W. Robertson, A New Approach to
Determining Seaman Status, 64 Tex. L. Rev. 79 (1985) [hereinafter A New Approach]; David W.
Robertson, Injuries to Marine Petroleum Workers: A Plea for Radical Simplification, 55 Tex. L. Rev.
973 (1977).
237. In some (but not all) of the federal circuits there is a tiny category of non-seamen who may
occasionally be protected by the unseaworthiness doctrine. See the discussion in Smith v. Harbor




For all of these purposes, seaman is defined as a "master or member of the crew
of any vessel." 238 The criteria for seaman status are indisputably governed by
federal law that binds the state courts.
In its 1991 decisions in Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni239 and
McDermott International, Inc. v. Wilander,24° the United States Supreme Court
significantly liberalized and clarified this area of law. Gizoni held that a rigging
foreman at a ship repair facility who worked on and rode floating work platforms
in the sheltered waters of the shipyard could qualify as a seaman on the basis of
his connection with the floating platforms. Wilander held that a paint foreman
working in a fixed-platform offshore oil field could qualify as a seaman on the
basis of his connection to the "paint boat" that took him among the platforms to
perform sandblasting, painting, and related maintenance.
Both Wilander and Gizoni jettisoned important bits of doctrine that had
developed in some of the lower courts as ways of limiting seaman status.
Wilander-the earlier and more important of the two decisions-jettisoned an
"aid to navigation" requirement that had been imposed by many lower courts,
explicitly holding that a worker need not be aboard his vessel in aid of
navigation to qualify as a seaman. Gizoni made clear that whether the worker
seeking seaman status was engaged in a type of work listed as covered
employment in the LHWCA 24' is not of major importance; a ship repairman
is a seaman if he has the requisite connection with a vessel or fleet of vessels.
The federal Second Circuit's recent decision in Latsis v. Chandris, Inc.242
constitutes an excellent discussion and summary of the effects of Wilander and
Gizoni, concluding:
[A]fter Wilander and Gizoni the test of seaman status under the Jones
Act is an employment-related connection to a vessel in navigation. The
test will be met where a jury finds that (1) the plaintiff contributed to
the function of, or helped accomplish the mission of, a vessel; (2) the
plaintiffs contribution was limited to a particular vessel or identifiable
group of vessels; (3) the plaintiff's contribution was substantial in terms
of its (a) duration or (b) nature; and (4) the course of the plaintiff's
employment regularly exposed the plaintiff to the hazards of the
sea.
243
238. The LHWCA excludes from its coverage "a master or member of a crew of any vessel."
Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)(G) (1988). Swanson v. Marra
Bros., Inc., 328 U.S. 1. 66 S. Ct. 869 (1946), held that the LHWCA term "master or member of a
crew of any vessel" defines the Jones Act term "seaman" and that the two acts are mutually exclusive
in their respective coverages. Id. at 6-8, 66 S. Ct. 871-72.
239. 502 U.S. 81, 112 S. Ct. 486 (1991).
240. 498 U.S. 337, 111 S. Ct. 807 (1991).
241. See 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (1988). See also infra part V.C.I.
242. 20 F.3d 45 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 354 (1994).
243. Id. at 57.
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The Wilander, Gizoni, and Latsis decisions make clear that "hazards of the sea"
is a term of art that includes not only all of the obvious dangers presented by the
oceans, but also the dangers presented by vessel movement and traffic in rivers
and other inland waters.2 " (After this article was prepared, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Latsis.24 5 It was argued on February 21, 1994.)
Decisions like Latsis indicate that Wilander and Gizoni constituted major
liberalizations in the law of seaman status. However, some panels of the federal
Fifth Circuit have shown resistance to that message. For example, that court has
recently held that a lower Mississippi River pilot, whose work continually
exposed him to sea perils, was not a seaman because "he was not permanently
assigned to any particular vessel or fleet of vessels. 246 (By contrast, the Latsis
court held that a "permanent assignment" requirement could not have survived
Wilander.247 ) Other Fifth Circuit panels have denied seaman status by
construing the vessel ingredient somewhat narrowly. 248
In post-WilanderlGizoni decisions, the Louisiana Supreme Court has refused
to adopt the narrower views of the federal Fifth Circuit judges. Instead, the
supreme court has read Wilander much as the federal Second Circuit reads it-as
completely jettisoning the purported aid-to-navigation requirement as well as
requiring significant modification of any idea that the worker's connection with
the vessel or group of vessels must be "permanent" or (in terms of duration)
"substantial." It is noteworthy that the federal Second Circuit's Latsis decision
relied in substantial part on the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Folse v.
Western Atlas International,249 in which the supreme court reversed a summary
judgment for the defendant and held that seaman status for a seismographic
survey worker who frequently went to sea on short trips on a number of different
vessels presented a question of fact.
244. See Robertson, A New Approach, supra note 236, at 80-81, 118-20, where the "perils of
the sea" concept is proposed as a key ingredient of seaman status determinations. The Latsis opinion
referred to this piece as "the Robertson article" and relied on it extensively. Latsis, 20 F.3d at 50-51,
53 n.3, 57. The Supreme Court's Wilander decision also relied on this article. See Wilander, 498
U.S. at 354, 11.1 S. Ct. at 817.
245. Chandris, Inc. .v. Latsis, 115 S. Ct. 354 (1994).
246. Bach v. Trident S.S. Co., 947 F.2d 1290, 1291 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1996 (1992). In a pre-Wilander decision the Bach panel-with Judge Brown passionately.
dissenting-had denied seaman status. Bach v. Trident S.S. Co., 920 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1991). That
decision was vacated by the Supreme Court and remanded for reconsideration in light of Wilander.
Bach v. Trident S.S. Co., 500 U.S. 949, 111 S. Ct. 2252 (1991). On remand, the Bach panel stated
"Wilander has no effect" on the case. Bach, 947 F.2d at 1291.
247. See Latsis, 20 F.3d at 52-55.
248. See, e.g., Ducrepont v. Baton Rouge Marine Enters., 877 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1989).
Ducrepont was decided before Gizoni, but is still being cited as good law. See DiGiovanni v. Traylor
Bros., Inc., 959 F.2d 1119, 1123 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 87 (1992).
249. 593 So. 2d 341 (La. 1992). See the Latsis discussion of Folse at Latsis, 20 F.3d at 56-57.
Folse, like Latsis and Wilander, relies to a considerable extent on "the Robertson article." Folse, 593
So. 2d at 342-43. See supra note 244.
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The Louisiana Supreme Court's other major post-WilanderlGizoni seaman
status decision was Ebanks v. Reserve Marine Enterprises,250 in which the
court of appeal had denied seaman status on the view that a crane barge spudded
into a river bottom was not a vessel for Jones Act purposes.25" ' The supreme
court granted a writ and summarily remanded the case, issuing a per curiam
opinion citing Gizoni and stressing that "whether a floating structure is a vessel,"
like all of the other issues involved in the seaman status determination, is
normally a question of fact.252
By rejecting some of the federal Fifth Circuit's doctrines that seem to limit
seaman status more narrowly than is consistent with the United States Supreme
Court's Wilander and Gizoni decisions, the Folse and Ebanks decisions have
once again253 demonstrated that state courts are of equal authority with the
lower federal courts in interpreting and applying maritime law. The state courts
of appeal have reflected the spirit of Ebanks and Folse by holding that the
seaman status issue normally presents a question for the trier of fact.254
250. 625 So. 2d 1050 (La. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1400 (1994). In an earlier decision the
supreme court used a liberal definition of the term "vessel" for purposes of the tort action permitted
by § 905(b) of the LHWCA, while indicating the Jones Act concept of "vessel" may be narrower.
Orgeron v. Avondale Shipyards, 561 So. 2d 38 (La. 1990). However, the Ebanks court cited Orgeron
right alongside Gizoni, thereby suggesting the term "vessel" should be defined the same way for
Jones Act and § 905(b) purposes. Ebanks, 625 So. 2d at 1050. See infra note 280 for a discussion
of 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1988).
251. Ebanks v. Reserve Marine Enters., 620 So. 2d 355 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1993).
252. Ebanks, 625 So. 2d at 1050.
253. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. See also the more general formulation of the
point in Justice Thomas' concurring opinion in Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. 838, 846 (1993)
(Thomas, J., concurring): "An Arkansas trial court is bound by this Court's (and by the Arkansas
Supreme Court's and the Arkansas Court of Appeals') interpretation of federal law, but if it follows
the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of federal law, it does so only because it chooses to and not
because it must."
254. See Cantrelle v. Kiva Constr. & Eng'g, Inc., 630 So. 2d 265 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993)
(affirming judgment for the plaintiff); LeBlanc v. Dynamic Offshore Contractors, Inc., 626 So. 2d
16 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993) (reversing summary judgment for the defendant and remanding the
seaman status issue for trial as a fact issue); Trahan v. Thenamaris Ship Management, Inc., 614 So.
2d 362 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993) (reversing summary judgment for the defendant and remanding the
seaman status issue for trial as a fact issue); Theriot v. McDermott, Inc., 611 So. 2d 129 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1992), writ denied, 615 So. 2d 342 (1993) (affirming judgment for plaintiff); Daugherty v.
Cross Marine, Inc., 598 So. 2d 595 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992) (affirming judgment for plaintiff);
Bercegeay v. Cal-Dive Int'l, Inc., 583 So. 2d 1181 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 589 So. 2d 1070
(1991) (reversing summary judgment for the defendant and remanding the seaman status issue for
trial as a fact issue). Cf. Duncan v. Offshore Food Serv., Inc., 633 So. 2d 350 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1993) (affirming denial of seaman status after trial on the merits). But see Gamer v. Pool Co., 595
So. 2d 751 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 598 So. 2d 358 (1992) (upholding summary judgment
for the defendant).
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B. Choice of Law (and Choice-of-Law Contractual Provisions) in
Transnational Cases
Three famous United States Supreme Court decisions (often called "the
Lauritzen trilogy ' '255) provide a methodology for determining when American
law applies to transnational cases involving injured seamen and similarly situated
tort victims: Lauritzen v. Larsen,26 Romero v. International Terminal Operat-
ing Co.,257 and Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis258 The 1982 amendment to
the Jones Act augments the law of the Lauritzen trilogy by severely limiting
foreign offshore oil and gas workers' access to American law. 9 All of this
choice-of-law apparatus is substantive federal law that binds the state courts. 260
It follows from the established characterization of the choice-of-law issue as
federal substantive law that the validity and interpretation of choice-of-law
clauses in maritime contracts is also a matter of federal law. 26' On the other
hand, recall that the validity and interpretation of forum selection clauses may
well be regarded as a procedural matter that is entirely controlled by state
law.262 Courts and litigants have sometimes seemed to overlook the distinction
between choice-of-law clauses and forum selection clauses.263 Whatever the
proper resolution of the unsettled question whether state or federal law governs
forum selection clauses, it does not advance sensible debate to equate forum
selection clauses with choice-of-law clauses. The distinction between the two
types of clauses has a useful analogy in the jurisprudence holding that while
parties to a dispute generally cannot confer or withhold judicial jurisdiction by
255. See, e.g., Mihalopoulos v. Westwind Africa Line, Ltd., 511 So. 2d 771, 774 (La. App. 5th
Cir. 1987).
256. 345 U.S. 571, 73 S. Ct. 921 (1953).
257. 358 U.S. 354, 79 S. Ct. 468 (1959).
258. 398 U.S. 306, 90 S. Ct. 1731 (1970).
259. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(b) (1988) generally denies such workers access to American law
except when it is shown that neither the worker's home country nor the place of injury provides any
remedy.
260. See Powell v. McDermott Int'l, Inc., 588 So. 2d 84, 86 (La. 1991) (using the Lauritzen
trilogy to uphold the applicability of United States law on behalf of an American oil and gas worker
hurt off the coast of West Africa and noting the issue "is governed by federal substantive admiralty
or maritime law"); Mihalopoulos v. Westwind Africa Line, Ltd., 511 So. 2d 771, 774 (La. App. 5th
Cir. 1987) (taking the trilogy as authoritative to uphold the applicability of United States law on
behalf of a Greek sailor hurt in France).
261. See, e.g., Prado v. Sloman Neptun Schiffahrts-A.G., 558 So. 2d 712, 714 (La. App. 4th
Cir.), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 565 So. 2d 930 (1990).
262. See supra part IV.B.
263. See, e.g., Prado v. Sloman Neptun Schiffahrts-A.G., 611 So. 2d 691, 695-99 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1992) (discussing federal cases involving forum selection and/or choice-of-law clauses and
eliding the distinction), writ not considered, 613 So. 2d 986 (1993); Mihalopoulos, 511 So. 2d at 773,
779 (noting the defendant had mistakenly attempted to treat a forum selection clause as a choice-of-
law provision).
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contract or stipulation, they can choose the substantive law that governs their
dispute.26
C. Litigation Concerning the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act (LHWCA)2 6
1. Coverage of the LHWCA and of the State Workers' Compensation Act
The LHWCA excludes seamen-"master[s] or member[s] of a crew of any
vessel"-from its coverage.266 For most other maritime workers, it provides
a federal workers' compensation remedy. 267  Its principal coverage requisites
are a so-called "status" requirement that the worker be "engaged in maritime
employment '2 68 and a "situs" requirement that the injury have occurred "upon
the navigable waters of the United States (including any adjoining pier, wharf,
dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area
customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, dismantling,
or building a vessel)., 269
Obviously this broad federal compensation statute goes well onto the land
and covers many workers and injuries that are also within the general coverage
of state workers' compensation statutes. Both the United States Supreme Court
and the Louisiana Supreme Court have held there is nothing in the LHWCA or
in the federal constitution hindering the applicability of state workers' compensa-
tion remedies to workers hurt on land under circumstances giving rise to
coverage by the LHWCA; 270 from that perspective the coverages of the two
264. See supra notes 107-110 and accompanying text.
265. See generally David W. Robertson, Jurisdiction, Shipowner Negligence, and Stevedore
Immunities Under the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's Act, 28 Mercer L. Rev. 515 (1977).
266. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)(G) (1988). See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
267. The LHWCA was originally enacted in 1927. It was so extensively amended in
1972-when its coverage was greatly expanded and many substantive and procedural changes were
made-as to amount to a virtually new Act. The Supreme Court has worked out the coverage of the
new Act in Herb's Welding, Inc. v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414, 105 S. Ct. 1421 (1985) (holding that, despite
the fact the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1333(b) (1988), makes the LHWCA
applicable to oil and gas workers hurt on fixed platforms on the Shelf-i.e., beyond three
geographical miles from shore-there is no LHWCA coverage for such workers hurt on fixed
platforms in territorial waters, i.e., waters within three geographical miles of the shore); Director v.
Perini N. River Assocs., 459 U.S. 297, 103 S. Ct. 634 (1983) (holding that workers hurt on vessels
afloat in navigable waters are covered without further inquiry into whether they were engaged in
maritime employment); P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69, 100 S. Ct. 328 (1979) (establishing
that moving cargo between a vessel and land transportation is LHWCA-covered maritime
employment); Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 97 S. Ct. 2348 (1977)
(explaining the LHWCA's "status" and "situs" requirements).
268. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (1988).
269. Id. § 903(a).
270. See Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 715, 100 S. Ct. 2432 (1980); Logan v.
Louisiana Dock Co., 541 So. 2d 182 (La.), cert. dismissed, 492 U.S. 939, 110 S. Ct. 30 (1989);
Thompson v. Teledyne Movible Offshore, Inc., 419 So. 2d 822 (La. 1982), appeal dismissed, 464
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regimes are concurrent in the substantial area of overlap. However, the
Louisiana legislature has recently amended the state workers' compensation
statute to provide that "[n]o [state workers'] compensation shall be payable in
respect to the disability or death of any employee covered by the Federal
Employer's Liability Act, the Longshoremen's [sic] and Harbor Worker's [sic]
Compensation Act, or any of its extensions, or the Jones Act. 27' This
amendment excludes most maritime workers from the state regime and leaves the
LHWCA as their sole remedy against their employers.272
2. "Statutory Employers" Under the LHWCA and Under State Law
Before the amendment to the Louisiana statute eliminated concurrent
LHWCA and state compensation coverage, a worker whose injury was covered
under both regimes could choose the compensation remedy to pursue. During
that era much litigation was produced by the marked difference between the
LHWCA and the Louisiana workers' compensation statute in their delimitation
of the entities to be immunized from tort liability by virtue of the compensation
remedy. The Louisiana statute extends tort immunity to a broad range of so-
called "statutory employers"-entities who are not the injured workers'
employers and who would enjoy no tort immunity under the federal act.273 By
choosing the federal compensation remedy, could an injured worker keep the
broad Louisiana statutory employer immunity from applying?
For a time the lower courts were divided on this question,274 but the
Louisiana Supreme Court eventually settled it affirmatively; Brown v. Avondale
U.S. 802, 104 S. Ct. 48 (mem.) (1983). See the discussion of Logan supra notes 113-115.
271. La. R.S. 23:1035.2 (Supp. 1994) (effective Jan. 1, 1990).
272. Recall it has always been regarded as unconstitutional under the Jensen doctrine for a state
to attempt to provide workers' compensation benefits to seamen. See supra note 115. Furthermore,
La. R.S. 23:1037 (1985) already contained a "seaman's exclusion." See Dupre v. Otis Eng'g Corp.,
641 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1981); Higgins v. State, 627 So. 2d 217, 220 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993),
writ denied, 634 So. 2d 374 (1994). See also infra text and notes 296-297. To this extent, the 1989
amendment to La. R.S. 23:1035 (1985 & Supp. 1994) seemingly makes no change. But the provision
cutting all LHWCA-covered injuries out of state compensation coverage is radical.
273. Under the LHWCA, entities that would be called "statutory employers" in Louisiana have
immunity from tort liability only if they actually provided workers' compensation benefits. See 33
U.S.C. § 904(a) (1988).
274. Cases indicating that the worker's choice of the LHWCA remedy did not keep the statutory
employer defense from applying include Brown v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 612 So. 2d 315 (La. App.
5th Cir.), rev'd, 617 So. 2d 482 (1993) (per curiam); Bourgeois v. Puerto Rican Marine Management,
Inc., 589 So. 2d 1226 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991), writs denied, 592 So. 2d 1299. 1300 (1992); Crater
v. Mesa Offshore Co, 539 So. 2d 88 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writs denied, 542 So. 2d 1382, 543 So. 2d
4, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 905, 110 S. Ct. 264 (1989); Lewis v. Modular Quarters, 508 So. 2d 975 (La.
App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 514 So. 2d 127 (1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1226, 108 S. Ct. 2886
(1988). Cases indicating the worker's choice of the LHWCA benefits kept the statutory employer
defense from applying include Jenkins v. McDermott, Inc., 734 F.2d 229 (5th Cir.), vacated in part
on rehearing, 742 F.2d 191 (1984), and Roberts v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 537 So. 2d 808 (La.
App. 5th Cir. 1989).
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Industries, Inc.275 held that when a worker elects federal compensation benefits,
he is then free to sue the non-employer entity in tort without having to contend
with the Louisiana statutory employer doctrine.276 Presumably, now that the
legislature has decreed that any injury compensable under the LHWCA is ipso
facto not covered by the state workers' compensation statute, the Brown decision
will stand for the proposition that the statutory employer doctrine has no
application to LHWCA-covered cases.
3. The "Borrowed Employee" Doctrine(s)
Under the LHWCA as under virtually all workers' compensation regimes,
the injured worker's employer is obligated to provide compensation benefits and
in return is immunized from all or most tort liability. The courts have devised
a "borrowed employee" doctrine that sometimes treats an entity who was not the
nominal or formal employer of the injured worker as an employer (both for
purposes of that entity's responsibility for providing workers' compensation
benefits and its immunity from tort liability). There is a nine-factor test for
borrowed employee status under the LHWCA,277 which is clearly an issue
controlled by federal law (although it is said that state law uses identical criteria
for determining borrowed employee status for state-law purposes).278
4. Tort Litigation by LHWCA-Covered Workers Against Non-Employers
As indicated, the LHWCA generally precludes tort litigation by covered
workers against their employers. 27 9 But Section 905(b) of the Act allows those
workers to bring negligence actions against the non-employer operators of vessels
whose fault may have contributed to their injuries. 280  The Section 905(b)
275. 617 So. 2d 482 (La. 1993) (per curiam), rev'g Brown v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 612 So. 2d
315 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1993).
276. See Charles v. United States, 15 F.3d 400 (5th Cir. 1994) (following the authority of Brown
and allowing tort litigation against a statutory employer by a worker who had elected LHWCA
benefits rather than state compensation benefits).
277. See Ledet v. Quality Shipyards, Inc., 615 So. 2d 990, 992 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993); Fanguy
v. Dupre Bros. Constr. Co., 588 So. 2d 1251, 1257 n.7 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991), writ denied, 594 So.
2d 892 (1992).
278. See Capps v. N.L. Baroid-NL Indus., Inc., 784 F.2d 615, 616 n.1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 838, 107 S. Ct. 141 (1986); Lorton v. Diamond M Drilling Co., 540 F.2d 212, 213 n.1 (5th
Cir. 1976).
279. 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (1988) makes workers compensation benefits the exclusive liability of
a covered employer. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1988) allows covered workers to sue non-employer vessel
operators for negligence. The second sentence of § 905(b) sets up a limited form of "dual capacity"
theory that allows a covered worker to maintain a negligence action against an employer who is also
a vessel operator, provided the injury-causing negligence can be shown to have occurred in the
defendant's vessel operator capacity as opposed to its employer capacity.
280. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1988) allows an action based on "the negligence of a vessel." 33
U.S.C. § 902(21) (1988) defines "vessel" for these purposes as
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negligence action is "exclusive of all other remedies against" vessel opera-
tors.2 ' Here federal law is preemptive. Section 905(b) precludes workers
covered by the LHWCA from suing vessel operators under state law.2"2
Section 905(b) was enacted to abolish the unseaworthiness remedy formerly
enjoyed by LHWCA workers. It does not provide any detail as to the content
of the negligence remedy to which LHWCA workers are now confined.
Determining the attributes of the Section 905(b) negligence cause of action has
been left to the courts. The nature and content of this negligence remedy is a
substantive maritime law issue as to which the state courts are bound to follow
the federal law.
The United States Supreme Court has established the major features of the
Section 905(b) cause of action in Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De los
Santos.. and the recent Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co.284 Under these
decisions, the vessel operator's duty is considerably more limited than under
mainstream negligence law. For example, in many circumstances in which
normal negligence law would impose a duty of inspection and vigilance, the
vessel operator's responsibility is dependent upon its actual knowledge of the
danger.2"5 For another example, vessel operators are often able to invoke an
"open and obvious" defense286 that mainstream negligence law would disap-
prove as being essentially identical to the now-discredited assumption of risk
doctrine. (The Louisiana fourth circuit's well-reasoned decision in Young v.
Armadores de Cabotaje,8 7 limiting the "open and obvious" defense, has
seemingly turned out to be wrong under the United States Supreme Court's new
Howlett decision. Indeed, after this article was prepared the United States
Supreme Court vacated Young and remanded it for further consideration in light
of Howlett.'")
any vessel upon which or in connection with which any person entitled to benefits under
this chapter suffers injury or death arising out of or in the course of his employment, and
said vessel's owner, owner pro hac vice, agent, operator, charter [sic] or bare boat
charterer, master, officer, or crew member.
281. See the final sentence of 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1988).
282. See Birden v. Dravo-Mechling Corp., 573 So. 2d 524 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990); Dean v.
State, 542 So. 2d 742 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 544 So. 2d 410 (1989). Cf May v.
Transworld Drilling Co., 786 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir.) (holding that LHWCA workers hurt on the land
under circumstances beyond the reach of admiralty tort jurisdiction have no remedy under § 905(b)
and intimating that § 905(b) is nevertheless preclusive of state tort law under such circumstances),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 854, 107 S, Ct. 190 (1986).
283. 451 U.S. 156, 101 S. Ct. 1614 (1981).
284. 114 S. Ct. 2057 (1994).
285. See Scindia Steam Navigation Co., 451 U.S. at 167-78, 101 S. Ct. at 1622-28.
286. See, e.g., Howlet, 114 S. Ct. at 2061-62.
287. 617 So. 2d 517 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writs denied, 625 So. 2d 170, 171 (1993), vacated on
other grounds, 114 S. Ct. 2701 (1994).
288. Armadores De Cabotaje, S.A. v. Young, 114 S. Ct. 2701 (1994).
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Note that the LHWCA has no direct bearing on tort litigation by covered
workers against entities who are neither employers nor vessel operators. 289 In
such cases, whether maritime law or state law controls will depend upon whether
the injury fell within the general admiralty tort jurisdiction. If not, state law will
govern.2" If so, general maritime tort law (as contrasted with the limited
negligence remedy of Section 905(b)) will govern. Here-as with other
instances falling within the admiralty tort jurisdiction29'-there is considerable
room for state law supplementation of the general maritime tort law.292
D. Maritime Workers Employed by Government Units293
Regarding state and local government-employed maritime workers other than
seamen, matters are extremely simple: These workers' rights against their
employers are exclusively governed by state law. The LHWCA excludes state
and local government employees from its coverage,294 and the Louisiana
Worker's Compensation Act explicitly provides that state workers' compensation
benefits constitute the "exclusive, compulsory, and obligatory" remedy of such
workers against their employers.295
Regarding seamen employed by the state or local government, the situation
is not quite so simple but apparently just the reverse: It seems that these
workers' rights against their employers are exclusively governed by federal
maritime law. Nothing in the Jones Act excludes state and local government
workers from its coverage, and there are at least three reasons for believing that
the Louisiana Worker's Compensation Act has no application to seamen.2 96
289. 33 U.S.C. § 933 (1988) gives the compensation-providing employer or insurance carrier an
interest in the employee's tort rights against non-employer entities, but does not directly affect the
tort litigation itself.
290. See the discussion of the requisites for general admiralty tort jurisdiction supra part II.A. 1.
Note the broadened geographic coverage of the LHWCA did not effect any corresponding broadening
of general admiralty tort jurisdiction. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
291. See, e.g., Green v. Industrial Helicopters, 593 So. 2d 634, 636 (La.) ("[The strict liability
doctrine of Louisiana Civil Code article] 2317 applies as a supplement to the remedies available
under the general maritime law ...."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 65 (1992). Green is discussed supra
note 112.
292. See, e.g., Moss v. Dixie Mach., Welding & Metal Works, Inc., 617 So. 2d 959 (La. App.
4th Cir.), writ denied, 620 So. 2d 845, cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 469 (1993). Moss is discussed supra
note 114.
293. We are here concerned with the maritime employees of state and local governments.
Federal maritime employees are generally confined to remedies under the Federal Employees'
Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
294. 33 U.S.C. § 903(b) (1988).
295. La. R.S. 23:1034 (1985 & Supp. 1995).
296. First, it is probably unconstitutional under the remnants of the Jensen doctrine for a state
workers' compensation regime to attempt to cover seamen. See supra note 115. Second, La. R.S.
23:1035.2 (Supp. 1995) states in pertinent part that "[n]o [state workers'] compensation shall be
payable in respect to the disability or death of any employee covered by ... the Jones Act." Third,
La. R.S. 23:1037 (1985) states in pertinent part that "nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to
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Thus it follows that these government workers can sue their employers under the
Jones Act and related maritime law doctrines.297 However, because of the
Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, states are not subject to
suit in federal court without their consent; hence the state-employed seaman must
normally pursue his Jones Act and related claims in state court.2 98
E. The Aftermath of Miles: Non-Pecuniary Compensatory Damages in
"Derivative" Actions
Non-pecuniary compensatory damages may be defined as damages for
injuries that cannot be quantified or measured in monetary terms. As a general
proposition, American tort law gives broad recognition to such damages, not only
routinely allowing recovery for pain and suffering caused by physical injuries but
also in some circumstances recognizing a right to recover for purely emotional
harms. 299 The federal maritime law is in general accord in these respects. The
victims of maritime torts regularly are awarded pain and suffering damages and
similar items of damages, and the courts have recognized that some maritime
injury victims can recover for purely emotional injuries.?
The foregoing paragraph addresses the recovery of non-pecuniary damages
by the primary victim of the tort. When we turn to what are sometimes called
"derivative" actions-actions brought by the family members of the primary
victim-the law is quite different. In many jurisdictions there is a marked
reluctance to allow non-pecuniary damages in derivative actions. Under this
view, there should be no right of consortium in non-fatality cases; and wrongful
death damages should not include damages for loss of companionship,
consortium, or society, but instead should be limited to loss of economic support
and loss of services.
Recently the federal maritime law has been moving toward eliminating non-
pecuniary damages in derivative actions. In Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.3' the
United States Supreme Court held that surviving family members of a deceased
apply to any work done on, nor shall any compensation be payable to the master, officers or members
of the crew of, any vessel used in interstate or foreign commerce not registered or enrolled in the
State of Louisiana."
297. See Higgins v. State, 627 So. 2d 217 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993), writ denied, 634 So. 2d 374
(1994); Cosey v. Department of Transp. & Dev., No. 92-C-2619 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 618
So. 2d 407, cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 285 (1993).
298. Welch v. Texas .Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987),
held the Eleventh Amendment precluded a state-employed seaman from bringing his Jones
Act/general maritime law suit against his employer in federal court.
299. See generally David W. Robertson, Liability in Negligence for Nervous Shock, 57 Mod. L.
Rev. 649 (1994).
300. See Gibbs v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 629 So. 2d 437 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993)
(discussing the jurisprudence and recognizing a seaman's right to recover for mental or emotional
injuries under the Jones Act).
301. 498 U.S. 19, 111 S. Ct. 317 (1990).
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seaman seeking wrongful death recovery on the basis of general maritime law
are limited to pecuniary loss damages and cannot recover for loss of society
(companionship). In several respects the decision was broadly framed. It
affirmed the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, but on broader
grounds than those used in Judge Rubin's opinion for that court. It articulated
a strong policy of interpreting the general maritime law in accordance with the
provisions of analogous statutes such as the Jones Act0 2 and the Death on the
High Seas Act.30 3 (Both of these statutes are limited to pecuniary losses in
their wrongful death features, hence precluding the recovery of damages for loss
of society in actions brought under them.)
However, in one puzzling respect the Miles opinion departed from its
generally broad thrust. Sixteen years earlier in Sea-Land Services, Inc. v.
Gaudet3 the Court had held that general maritime wrongful death plaintiffs
could recover damages for loss of society. In the intervening years the Gaudet
decision had been steadily whittled down. By the time Miles was decided,
Gaudet's generosity was limited to the surviving spouses of LHWCA-covered
workers killed in territorial waters (i.e., within a marine league from shore).
Oddly, Miles did not overrule Gaudet,305 thus leaving a small group of
maritime wrongful death plaintiffs who are still apparently entitled to recover
damages for loss of society.
The post-Miles cases in the lower courts have easily concluded that the
survivors of deceased seamen can no longer recover for loss of society. It has
also been apparent that the logic of Miles must preclude allowing the family
members of non-fatally injured seamen to recover for loss of consortium or
companionship.3" The Louisiana courts have so held. 7  These holdings
entail the view that state wrongful death and loss of consortium law can not
validly apply in cases involving deaths and injuries of seamen.
The difficult questions presented by post-Miles cases relate to injuries (both
fatal and non-fatal) to workers other than seamen. At least one Louisiana
appellate court has held that Gaudet should no longer be followed-i.e., that the
widow and children of an LHWCA-covered worker killed in territorial waters
should not be allowed to recover damages for loss of society.08 Other judges
302. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988).
303. Id. §§ 761-768.
304. 414 U.S. 573, 94 S. Ct. 806 (1974).
305. See Miles, 498 U.S. at 31, 111 S. Ct. at 325 ("The holding of Gaudet applies only in
territorial waters, and it applies only to longshoremen.").
306. See, e.g., Michel v. Total Transp., Inc., 957 F.2d 186 (5th Cir. 1992).
307. See Dixon v. Cliffs Drilling Co., 633 So. 2d 277 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993); Jenkins v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 613 So. 2d 1097 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writs denied, 616 So. 2d 701, 702 (1993); Trahan
v. Texaco, Inc., 625 So. 2d 295 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993); Phillips v. Water Towing, Inc., 620 So.
2d 1387 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 629 So. 2d 1135 (1993); Fortenberry v. ODECO, Inc., 607
So. 2d 950 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992); Dickey v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 598 So. 2d 1259
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1992).
308. See Vedros v. Public Grain Elevator of New Orleans, Inc., 620 So. 2d 1376 (La. App. 4th
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disagree, contending that Miles should be confined to Jones Act and unseaworthi-
ness litigation involving injured or deceased seamen, and thai the family
members of LHWCA-covered workers,3 as well as those of seamen in
litigation against defendants other than the typical Jones Act and unseaworthiness
targets,310 should be allowed to recover their non-pecuniary losses.
Essentially the issue is how broadly should Miles be read? It appears likely
that those who contend for a broad reading will prevail. Probably it will soon
be settled that no maritime-worker injury, whether fatal or nonfatal, provides a
basis for an award of damages for loss of consortium, companionship, or
society.
F. The Aftermath of Miles: Punitive Damages
There is not a word in the Miles decision about punitive damages, but a
number of lower courts around the country have seized upon it as a basis for
concluding that punitive damages are no longer awardable in general maritime
law cases.312 In brief, the reasoning of such courts is this: Miles rests upon
a strong policy of conforming the general maritime law to the Jones Act and the
Death on the High Seas Act. It is thought to be settled that these statutes
preclude the award of punitive damages. Ergo, punitive damages should not be
awardable under the general maritime law either.
In Mistich v. Pipelines, Inc. 31 3 the Louisiana fourth circuit strongly rejected
the foregoing view of Miles, stating:
We disagree with the proposition that after Miles punitive damages are
no longer available under the maritime law in claims based on
unseaworthiness. There is no definitive federal or state appellate court
decision in this circuit or state holding that punitive damages are not
recoverable under the Jones Act, much less under the general maritime
law. Punitive damages are in a class apart from other non-pecuniary
damages. They serve the purpose of punishing the particular defendant,
hopefully teaching him not to engage in the willful and wanton conduct
again. Perhaps even more importantly, punitive damages deter others
from following that defendant's example. Also, unlike the damages for
loss of society addressed in Miles, and similar non-pecuniary but
Cir. 1993).
309. See id. at 1378-87 (Waltzer, J., dissenting).
310. See Phillips, 620 So. 2d at 1390 (Waltzer, J., dissenting).
311. Cf Green v. Industrial Helicopters, Inc., 593 So. 2d 634, 645 (La.) (Watson, J., concurring
and suggesting federal maritime law preemption may be more sweeping in wrongful death and related
litigation than in litigation by the primary victim of a non-fatal injury), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 65
(1992).
312. See, e.g., Penrod Drilling Corp. v. Williams, 868 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. 1993).
313. 609 So. 2d 921 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992), writ denied, 613 So. 2d 996, cert. denied sub
nom. Brown & Root, Inc. v. Mistich, 113 S. Ct. 3020 (1993).
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compensatory damages, punitive damages are by nature non-compensa-
tory.
314
Most of the Louisiana decisions discussing the point have agreed in general
terms with the Mistich court.1 In addition, without discussing the point,
several courts have apparently assumed that the applicable law of punitive
damages on behalf of seamen is unaffected by Miles.316 (After this article was
prepared, the fourth circuit overruled Mistich.31 7)
Several other post-Miles cases have involved punitive damage claims in the
rather specialized context of seamen employers' wrongful failure to provide
maintenance and cure. This is the one area where (at least until Miles) the
allowance of punitive damages as a matter of general maritime law was not in
the least controversial. 318  Aside from one highly questionable decision,3'9 the
Louisiana courts have been in accord in continuing to uphold the availability of
such damages in appropriate cases without any indication that Miles may cast
doubt on the propriety of the practice.320 This is the correct view; it would be
314. Id. at 935 (citation omitted).
315. See Duplantis v. Texaco, Inc., 771 F. Supp. 787, 788-89 (E.D. La. 1991) (holding punitive
damages may be awarded in seaman's suit based on general maritime negligence); Butler v. Zapata
Haynie Corp., 633 So. 2d 1274, 1283 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994) ("Punitive damages are available under
a Jones Act claim for negligence and a claim for the arbitrary denial of maintenance and cure to an
injured seaman.").
316. See Seymour v. CIGNA Ins. Co., 622 So. 2d 839, 845 (La. App. 5th Cir.) (denying punitive
damages to a seaman suing under the Jones Act, based on the factual merits of the case at hand and
without mentioning Miles), writ denied, 629 So. 2d 1136 (1993); Thomas v. BJ. Titan Servs. Co.,
595 So. 2d 1275, 1276 (La. App. 4th Cir.) (holding that on an appropriate factual showing a seaman
can be awarded'punitive damages against his employer under Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.3,
which concerns reckless storage, handling, or transportation of hazardous or toxic substances), writ
denied, 600 So. 2d 603 (1992). Cf Bergeron v. Mike Hooks, Inc., 626 So. 2d 724, 727-28 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1993) (denying punitive damages on the merits in a collision case without any mention of
Miles).
317. Bridgett v. ODECO, Inc., 646 So. 2d 1249, 1254 & n.4 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1994), writs
denied, 651 So. 2d 840, 840 (1995).
318. See generally Judge Rubin's excellent opinion in Morales v. Garijak, Inc., 829 F.2d 1355
(5th Cir. 1987).
319. See Gray v. Texaco, Inc., 610 So. 2d 1090, 1096 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992) ("[lI]n order that
we be consistent with the decision in Miles ... we hold that punitive damages in maintenance and
cure claims are denied."), writs denied, 616 So. 2d 686, 687 (1993).
320. See Butler v. Zapata Haynie Corp., 633 So. 2d 1274, 1283 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994)
(containing dictum that punitive damages for arbitrary and capricious refusal to provide maintenance
and cure are still available after Miles); Jordan v. Intercontinental Bulktank Corp., 621 So. 2d 1141
(La. App. 1st Cir.) (upholding an award of punitive damages for failure to pay maintenance and
cure), writs denied, 623 So. 2d 1335, 1336 (1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 926 (1994); Thurman v.
Patton-Tully Transp. Co., 619 So. 2d 879, 881 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993) (containing dictum that
punitive damages for arbitrary and capricious refusal to provide maintenance and cure are still
available after Miles). Cf Theriot v. McDermott, Inc., 611 So. 2d 129 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1992)
(denying punitive damages in a maintenance and cure case, but on the merits and without mention
of Miles), writ denied, 615 So. 2d 342 (1993).
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astonishing (and somewhat alarming) if the Miles decision could be read to
abolish a well-settled category of maritime law damages without having
mentioned it. (After this article was prepared, the federal Fifth Circuit granted
en banc rehearing on the issue of punitive damages for withholding maintenance
and cure.321)
G. Comparative Fault Issues
Conflicts between state law and federal maritime law can arise as to at least
four aspects of the law of comparative fault. First is the basic rule governing the
effect of the fault of a tort victim. Here the law is clear. The general maritime
law rule of pure comparative fault-whereby a plaintiff who is assessed with
ninety-nine percent of the fault is awarded one percent of the total damag-
es--controls over any conflicting state law rule.322  Of course, on this matter
there is no conflict in Louisiana, which also follows the rule of pure comparative
fault.323
The second potential conflict concerns the responsibility of multiple
defendants who have been assessed fault. The maritime law rule is that such
defendants are jointly and severally liable (solidarily liable) to the plaintiff for
the full amount of the recoverable damages;324 they have contribution rights
against each other such that (assuming full solvency) each will ultimately bear
its individual percentage share of the damages.325  The Louisiana rule on this
matter differs in only one respect: Under the recently amended Louisiana Civil
Code article 2324, in many cases a solidarily obligated tortfeasor will not owe
the plaintiffs full recoverable damages but only fifty percent thereof.
326
Given that the Louisiana and maritime rules differ as to the extent of a co-
tortfeasor's solidary (joint and several) responsibility, one must know which rule
will control in a saving clause case. No authority directly on point exists, but
the Louisiana Supreme Court's 1986 per curiam decision in Daigle v. Coastal
321. See Guevara v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 34 F.3d 1279 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), reh'g
granted en banc, No. 92-4711 (5th Cir. Nov. 4, 1994).
322. The cases establishing that the federal maritime rule is pure comparative fault across the
board include United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 95 S. Ct. 1708 (1975), and
Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 79 S. Ct. 406 (1959). Decisions
establishing that this rule trumps any conflicting state law rule include Kermarec and Pope & Talbot,
Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 74 S. Ct. 202 (1953).
323. La. Civ. Code art. 2323.
324. See McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 114 S. Ct. 1461 (1994); Edmonds v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique. 443 U.S. 256, 99 S. Ct. 2753 (1979). See also John E. Graham & Sons
v. Bertrand, 114 S. Ct. 1647 (1994) (denying certiorari from Bertrand v. Mobil Oil Exploration, 15
F.3d 180 (5th Cir. 1994) (table)).
325. See Edmonds, 443 U.S. at 260 & n.8, 99 S. Ct. at 2756 & n.8; Cooper Stevedoring Co. v.
Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106, 113-15, 94 S. Ct. 2174, 2178-79 (1974).
326. See Touchard v. Williams, 617 So. 2d 885 (La. 1993). See generally David W. Robertson,
Solidary Liability in Tort: Understanding Gauthier and Touchard, pts. 1 & 2, 41 La. B.J. 227 (Oct.
1993), 41 La. B.J. 334 (Dec. 1993).
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Marine, Inc.327 definitively implies that the maritime rule will govern.328
Given the United States Supreme Court's demonstrated commitment to the full
array and implications of its comparative fault regime, 329 Daigle's answer
seems correct.
The third potential conflict arises when one of several tortfeasors has entered
into a partial settlement with the plaintiff.30 Under settled Louisiana law, the
plaintiff's damages are reduced by the settling tortfeasor's percentage-fault share
of the damages, and the settling tortfeasor is neither amenable to contribution nor
(except in rare instances3a ) able to assert a contribution claim. 3 32 Until
recently, the maritime law treatment of partial settlements was much less lucid.
But in two recents maritime law decisions, the United States Supreme Court has
(at least for the time being) obviated any conflict. McDermott, Inc. v.
AmClyde333 establishes that percentage-fault credit is the correct approach, and
that ordinarily a settling tortfeasor has "no right of contribution against other
defendants. 334  Boca Grande Club, Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co. 335
adds (as was already implicit in AmClyde) that "actions for contribution against
settling [tortfeasors] are neither necessary nor permitted." Thus the United States
Supreme Court has settled a long-simmering conflict among the federal admiralty
courts by adopting a settlement-credit system that is identical to Louisiana's.
The fourth potential conflict involves the potential effect of the fault of
"phantom tortfeasors," defined as tortfeasors who have neither settled with ,the
plaintiff nor been made parties to the lawsuit. (One type of phantom tortfeasor
is an employer who is immune under a workers' compensation statute from being
sued by the plaintiff or by the defendant for contribution or indemnity. Another
type is a hit-and-run driver. These are merely examples. The key feature all
327. 488 So. 2d 679 (La. 1986).
328. In Daigle, a passenger-injury case, the Court said maritime law would control "on the issue
of [the defendant's] liability for the fault of ... absent ... tortfeasors." Id. at 682. A fortiori,
maritime law would control on the more fundamental solidarity issue.
329. See the cases cited supra notes 322, 324, and 325. In the recent AmClyde decision, the
United States Supreme Court strongly reaffirmed "the well-established principle of joint and several
liability"; and it chose a percentage-fault approach to giving credit for a partial settlement in major
part because of that approach's "consistency with Reliable Transfer['s basic pure comparative fault
rule]." McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 114 S. Ct. 1461, 1463, 1470 (1994).
330. See Steptoe v. Lallie Kemp Hosp., 634 So. 2d 331, 337 & n.1 (La. 1994) (Watson, J.,
concurring and noting that decisions of some lower federal courts using a dollar-for-dollar credit
approach conflict with Louisiana law and that the Supreme Court had the matter under consideration
in McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde).
331. See Ducote v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 616 So. 2d 1366 (La. App. 3d Cir.) (involving
a tortfeasor who settled the entire debt acquired contribution rights against co-tortfeasors via legal
subrogation), writ denied, 620 So. 2d 877 (1993).
332. See Robertson, supra note 326. See also David W. Robertson, The Louisiana Law of
Comparative Fault: A Decade of Progress 38-43, in 1 Louisiana Practice Series (1991).
333. 114 S. Ct. 1461 (1994).
334. Id. at 1467.
335. 114 S. Ct. 1472 (1994).
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phantom tortfeasors have in common is that they have neither settled with the
victim nor been made a party defendant or a third-party defendant in the
lawsuit). Under current Louisiana law it is proper to assign to a phantom
tortfeasor a percentage of the total fault, which is then reallocated as between the
plaintiff and defendant(s) in proportion to the plaintiff's and defendant(s)'
respective degrees of fault as between themselves.336 The maritime law rule
on this matter is not as clear as might be wished, but in all probability it
provides that phantom tortfeasor fault should not be assessed.337
The federal-state conflict on the proper treatment of phantom tortfeasors is
potentially troublesome3 3 ' and it is fortunate that the Louisiana Supreme Court
is on record with the resolution. In Daigle v. Coastal Marine, Inc. 339 the trier
of fact assessed fault against the plaintiff (a boat passenger), the defendant
Coastal Marine, and "absent tortfeasors." The Supreme Court reversed and
remanded the case on other grounds, stating: "If there is any conflict with
federal law on the issue of Coastal's liability for the fault of the absent ...
tortfeasors, federal law would prevail.
' 340
Thus, Daigle provides the answer: On issues of phantom tortfeasor fault,
the federal maritime law preempts contradictory state law. But it is unfortunately
not so easy to know what that answer means in particular contexts. On remand
in Daigle, the court of appeal purported to follow the federal approach; 341'
reassessed the fault percentages so that they were twenty percent to the plaintiff,
forty-five percent to the defendant, and thirty-five percent to the phantom
tortfeasors;3 2 and awarded the plaintiff eighty percent of the total damages,
thus in effect assigning to the defendant its own percentage plus the percentage
336. See Gauthier v. O'Brien, 618 So. 2d 825 (La. 1993); Robertson, supra note 326.
337. Samuels v. Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas, 573 F.2d 884, 885 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 443 U.S. 915, 99 S. Ct. 3106 (1979), held an immune employer's fault should not be
assessed. See also Young v. Armadores de Cabotaje, S.A., 617 So. 2d 517, 534 (La. App. 4th Cir.)
("[Ilit has been held that ... the issue of an employing stevedore's negligence should not be
submitted to the jury."), writs denied, 625 So. 2d 170, 171 (1993), vacated on other grounds, 114
S. Ct. 2701 (1994). Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 270-71 & nn.
28-30, 99 S. Ct. 2753, 2762 & nn. 28-30 (1979), strongly implied an immune employer's fault should
not be assessed. AmClyde spoke approvingly of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, which provides
against assessing the fault of phantom tortfeasors. And the AmClyde opinion states that having the
parties argue about the fault of the "empty chair" [the settling tortfeasor] is an unavoidable (and
therefore acceptable) disadvantage of the percentage-fault approach to settlement credit. AmClyde,
114 S. Ct. at 1470. This passage in AmClyde implies the disadvantage would not be countenanced
except as to a settling tortfeasor.
338. See Young, 617 So. 2d at 534 (expressing relief that under the then-applicable (pre-
Gauthier) state of Louisiana law there was no conflict, so that it was clear that an immune
employer's fault should not be assessed).
339. 488 So. 2d 679 (La. 1986).
340. Id. at 682.
341. Daigle v. Coastal Marine. Inc., 500 So. 2d 823, 826 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986).
342. Id. at 827.
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attributed to the phantom tortfeasors. 3" This is not what the federal approach
called for. After reading the controlling federal decisions, one must conclude it
was error for the Daigle trial court to have assigned percentage fault to the
phantom tortfeasors. Thus, the court of appeal should have either remanded the
case for new percentage fault findings confined to the plaintiff and defendant, or
(under the usual Louisiana appellate practice) itself reassessed the fault of the
plaintiff and the defendant so that those two percentages totaled one-hundred
percent. Alternatively, the court of appeal should have done what appellate
courts in all systems occasionally must do when confronted with irrelevant fault
assessments: 344 use a ratio approach to bracket or ignore the unwanted finding.
Under such a ratio approach in Daigle, the plaintiffs share would have become
20/65ths and the defendant's share 45/65ths.? Defendant would then have
owed 45/65ths of the damages (sixty-nine percent), rather than eighty percent.
The fact that potential conflicts between state and federal law continue to
exist over some comparative fault issues should not be permitted to obscure the
main message of this subsection: The United States Supreme Court's AmClyde
and Boca Grande decisions provide major clarification. To reiterate, in those
cases the unanimous Court has (a) adopted a percentage fault system for giving
credit for partial settlements; (b) indicated settling tortfeasors are neither
amenable to nor able to seek contribution; (c) reaffirmed the rule of full joint and
several liability; and (d) suggested that it is a bad idea to assign percentage fault
to phantom tortfeasors. In the first two respects, the maritime law now fully
conforms with Louisiana law. In the last two respects, the maritime law and
Louisiana law will occasionally be in conflict. When such conflict occurs,
according to the Louisiana Supreme Court's Daigle opinion the maritime law
should govern.
H. Direct Actions Against Marine Insurers
It is an odd fact that there is very little established federal law governing
marine insurance contracts. As Professor Maraist explains:
[I]n Wilburn Boat Company v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., the
Supreme Court ruled that a marine insurance contract is governed by
state law unless there is an applicable federal statute or a settled
maritime common law rule governing the issue .... The lower courts
have been faithful to Wilburn; although they have found and applied
some "well-established" federal rules, they have disposed of most
marine insurance questions by applying state law.34
343. I at 828.
344. See Robertson, supra note 332, at 77-80.
345. See Robertson, supra note 326, at 228-29.
346. Maraist, supra note 1, at 110-11.
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Louisiana courts have typically looked to state law in deciding marine insurance
questions.4 7
Probably the most dramatic" feature of Louisiana insurance law is the direct
action statute, 4 9 which "allows an injured party to proceed directly against an
insurance company which has issued a policy or contract of insurance against the
liability of the insured tortfeasor. ' '35 0 The Louisiana Supreme Court has recently
settled an old controversy over whether marine protection and indemnity (P&I)
insurers are subject to direct actions; under Justice Kimball's decision for the
unanimous court in Grubbs v. Gulf lnternational Marine,351 they are.
Grubbs was the supreme court's answer to a certified question from the federal
Fifth Circuit. The issue had created difficulty for the lower courts because of
facially conflicting language in the Louisiana insurance statutes. The direct action
statute itself covers "all liability policies, 35 2 whereas the statute delimiting the
"scope" of Part XIV of the Louisiana Insurance Code (where the direct action
statute appears) states in pertinent part that "[tihe applicable provisions of this Part
shall apply to insurance other than ocean marine.., insurance. '353 On the settled
understanding that P&I insurance is both liability insurance 35 4 and also a type of
"ocean marine insurance, 3 55 the direct action statute and the "scope" statute
seemed to collide. Grubbs resolved the conflict by concluding that the "applicable
provisions" language of the "scope" statute was not meant to embrace the direct
action statute. For many years before the direct action statute became part of the
Insurance Code, it had been well settled that P&I insurers were subject to direct
actions. The Grubbs court could find no plausible indication that the legislature's
bringing the direct action statute into the Insurance Code had been intended to
change that settled understanding, and concluded:
In sum, the text, purpose, and legislative history of the Louisiana Direct
Action Statute and the Louisiana Insurance Code lead us to conclude that
within its terms the statute permits all injured persons to maintain direct
actions against all liability insurers, including P&I insurers. 356
347. See, e.g., Sledge v. Louisiana Dep't of Transp. & Dcv., 492 So. 2d 139, 143-44 (La. App.
1st Cir.), writ denied, 494 So. 2d 1176 (1986).
348. See Colleman v. Jahncke Serv., Inc., 341 F.2d 956, 961 (5th Cir. 1965) ("[H]istorically no
love has been lost between the direct action statute and the Fifth Circuit ...."), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 974, 86 S. Ct. 538 (1966)
349. La. R.S. 22:655 (1978 & Supp. 1994).
350. Grubbs v. Gulf Int'l Marine, Inc., 625 So. 2d 495, 497 (La. 1993).
351. Id.
352. La. R.S. 22:655(D) (Supp. 1994).
353. La. R.S. 22:611(A) (1978 & Supp. 1994).
354. See Maraist, supra note 1, at 115: "The primary purpose of modem P&I insurance is to
provide public liability coverage to the shipowner ......
355. See Backhus v. Transit Casualty Co., 549 So. 2d 283, 289 (La. 1989) ("[T]he term 'ocean
marine insurance' includes protection and indemnity insurance .... ).




The imagined reader has been a state-court judge, charged with the
responsibility of sorting out an argument between maritime litigants about the
content and preemptive force of some federal doctrine and wishing for more
impartial guidance than the lawyers are providing. In these matters the lawyers
before the court will sometimes seem less than sufficiently helpful. The normal
problems of partisanship will often be exacerbated by a tendency of some
admiralty experts to use the field's arcane vocabulary and conceptual apparatus
as an instrument of power rather than of communication." 7
To the imagined reader this article has offered some specific information and
the following three broad pieces of advice. All of this general advice is meant
to help the state judge find fair and relatively simple ways to disentangle these
disputes.
First, do not be persuaded by the decisions of lower federal courts unless
they are in fact persuasive. Sometimes they are not. Your beacons are the
Louisiana Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court. The federal
Fifth Circuit can be your friend, sometimes, but not your mentor.
Second, if the matter is plausibly procedural, apply state law absent an
unmistakable showing of federal compulsion. Unless American Dredging Co.
is dramatically modified, such a showing will rarely appear.
Third, as to matters that are straightforwardly substantive in their nature,
clearly established federal maritime rules must be regarded as binding. Even
here, though, the significant possibility exists that state law can intelligently
supplement the federal law.
357. See David W. Robertson, Admiralty Jurisdiction and Procedure After the 1966 Unification,
74 Mich. L. Rev. 1627 (1976) (discussing the organized maritime bar's unsuccessful resistance to
bringing the old admiralty procedural rules into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
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